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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of Christianity, theologians have sought to 
express the doctrines of the faith in cogent and unassailable terms. In 
so doing, they have latched on to any number of philosophical systems 
that appear to be conducive to such transmission. It has been argued 
that such uses of philosophy by theology are both theologically danger-
ous and philosophically impoverished. That is a difficult argument to 
uphold, although, historically, it might find justifying examples. In 
any event, it seems impossible for humans to couch their religious 
thoughts in anything but human modes of thought, which is the task of 
philosophy. 
The Purpose of the Study 
It is the expressed purpose of this study to investigate the possi-
bilities for theological use of process philosophy. Within that scope 
and purpose, certain objects had to be met. First, it was necessary to 
understand as fully as possible the philosophical system itself. Second, 
certain judgements had to be made as to the availability of that system 
for theological and religious purposes. Finally, it was necessary to 
expand on the philosophical scheme to include certain theological no-
tions that are not inherent in the system. 
Process philosophy, and any theologies that develop from it, holds 
a particular fascination for this writer. First, it is truly a twentieth-
century philosophy. This, in itself, does not make it a better philoso- 
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phy than those which preceded it. It does, however, allow for certain 
advantages; because of its historical position, it has the advantage of 
being able to evaluate and criticize previous philosophies and, hopeful-
ly, employ what is good in them and avoid what is bad. Second, process 
philosophy is a whole new kind of philosophical undertaking for this 
period. The current philosophical scene has a great disregard, if not 
distain, for metaphysics. Process is one of the few newly-developed 
philosophies for which metaphysics is a sympathetic concern. Third, pro-
cess seems to hold open some doors that are viable options for theolog-
ical assertions. There are places at which process and 'traditional' 
theology must diverge; but there are several areas that would allow even 
conservative theologians the opportunity to express the faith in terms 
that are not only cogent to contemporary man, but even acceptable to 
Because of the nature of this paper, and the time allocated for it, 
it is impossible to do full justice to the philosophical scheme, much 
less to any theological insights that might be gleaned from it. Within 
the past few years, the influx of process theologians has become over-
whelming. It was impossible, therefore, to touch all bases and evaluate 
every critique of process and every development upon it. Consquently, 
the following has been the guiding principle for investigation. I have 
tried, wherever possible, to read and digest the writings of whom I con-
sider to be the two major figures in the development of process-thought: 
Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Whitehead's writings con-
tain such technical vocabulary that it is nearly prohibitive, and I had 
to resort to secondary sources to get a hold on his thought. However, I 
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have tried, within my limitations, to use secondary sources only where 
the primary sources of Whitehead were completely mystifying, or unavail-
able. Whitehead's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Know-
ledge and his The Principle of Relativity were not available; limited 
access to his Modes of Thought was available. The paucity of references 
to and insights from these works might be noticeable. Hartshorne's pro-
fuse output precluded investigation of his many articles in periodicals 
and journals, although a few were selected solely on the basis of their 
titles, as they appeared to apply to some particular aspect of this 
study. Another notable lack was his important work, Reality as Social  
Process, which was not available. I would hope that its lack will not 
prove a serious defect. 
Having investigated the many writings of these influential men, I 
set to read as many theologians, who based their work on these two 
men's thought, as was possible in the allotted time. Several interesting 
observations come from those readings. It was noted that many of them 
seem to have merely reiterated Whitehead's theory of God, in a somewhat 
Christian context. I choose to call the Christianity of such endeavors 
"Christicism", which I define as an attitude that whatever sounds like 
it might be religious, or could possibly be altered to become so, is 
available and necessary for Christian teaching and assertion. Little 
has been done in these works in the areas of christology, pneumatology, 
ecclisiology, ethics, or eschatology, which qualifies their 'Christian' 
aspect heavily. 
The purpose of this raper, then, in its entirety, is to outline, 
as cogently as possible, the various options that process-thought 
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offers for Christian thinking. There is an inherent danger in this en-
terprize, a danger which is two-fold. There are some points at which 
this philosophy and traditional Christian theology are irreconcilable. 
Those have been noted where they have been noticed. But the danger is 
that they will not be noticed. Second, it is my hope that where I have 
extended beyond any previous applications of process-thought to points 
of doctrine I have done so well and accurately. 
In writing the issues of theological concern, some assumptions 
have been operative. The basic options that have been employed stem 
from a Lutheran perspective on the Scriptures and the nature of the the-
ological task. This work, therefore, might be judged from the stand-
point of how well the theological options have been considered within 
that framework. Further, in using this perspective, the author has 
tried to be sympathetic to process-thought and work, or rework, it to 
conform to that perspective. The relationship between revealed and 
natural theology has been taken with utmost seriousness. The author 
fully realizes that certain doctrines are discoverable only from the 
realm of revealed theology and can never be fully integrated into a 
natural theological scheme. It does seem possible, however, to suggest 
some ways that such a natural theology can express those doctrines, and 
I have tried to show that. 
The Summary of the Paper 
The next chapter (II) deals with a hodgepodge of issues that were 
considered necessary but limited enough to refrain from including aska 
separate chapter. These include a summary of both Hartshorne's and 
5 
Whitehead's evaluation and use of philosophers that preceded them. An 
evaluation of the entire metaphysical enterprise is also included here, 
with the intent of giving another tool for evaluating process material. 
Included, too, is a very brief history of process theological thought 
in this century, which sketches major developments and has no intent of 
being anywhere near inclusive or comprehensive. Finally, because both 
Hartshorne and Whitehead are the giant figures in this development, 
short biographical sketches have been included. 
Chapter III has a more intense purpose. This chapter is an exposi-
tion of the systems of both Whitehead and Hartshorne. No truly logical 
order was established for this exposition; the organizing principle was 
some of the chief technical words of Whitehead and the major concerns 
of Hartshorne. Again, this is an exposition, not an interpretation or 
commentary; its intent is to furnish the basics of these men's thoughts 
so that we might better be able to use them in theologizing. 
Chapter IV is the first point at which this paper intends to be-
come critical. In this chapter we shall examine some significant theo-
logical doctrines in the light of process-thought, The doctrines to be 
considered are the notion of God, a plausible Christology, a process 
anthropology, a possible pneumatology, the issues involved in eschatol-
ogy, some notion and concept of the Church, and an exploration of pro-
cess ethics, In each case, where Whitehead and Hartshorne have some-
thing definite to say, that is, where they actually addressed themselves 
to the issue in their writings, we shall present that two-fold approach
. 
 
In those instances where they have had little to say, that is, they have 
mentioned or only discussed the issue only briefly, we shall tend to 
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amalgamate the two positions. Where we have extended the systems to 
areas untouched by their thought directly, we shall endeavor to show 
how we can support our contentions with references to both. 
Some Notations 
Throughout the text of this study, the major works of the two pro- 
ponents here considered are abbreviated. The standard abbreviations 
used for each man are: 
Whitehead: AI Adventures of Ideas 
PR Process and Reality 
SMW Science and the Modern World 
CN The Concept of Nature 
Sym Symbolism: It Meaning and Effects 
RM Religion in the Making 
MT Modes of Thought 
Hartshorne: BH Beyond Humanism 
LP The Logic of Perfection 
DR The Divine Relativity 
AD Anselm's Discovery 
NVG Man's Vision of God 
NT A Natural Theology for our Time 
CSP Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method 
These abbreviations are employed simply for the sake of space. Full 
bibliographical information on these books will be included in the 
bibliography for the entire study. 
CHAPTER II 
PROCESS-THINKERS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS 
To understand any development in philosophical thought, it is nec-
essary to understand the thought-modes that preceded it. This is espe-
cially true of a systematic metaphysics, since it must borrow so exten-
sively from previous schemes both in language and concepts. It is in-
teresting, but hardly profitable, to trace these conceptual strands back 
to the earliest musings of the pre-Socratic Greeks. It is much more pro-
ductive to look in detail at those philosophies which are more contem-
porary with this system under investigation. It is also very helpful to 
examine in what way any system devotes its attention to the philosophi-
cal giants of the modern era- Kant, Hume, and Descartes -and how they 
are employed. It is of extreme importance to note to what extent previ-
ous philosophies have positively or negatively affected the current 
material. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to devote itself to a cursory 
examination of those thought-schemes which preceded process-thought. 
Observations will be made concerning the entire metaphysical enterprise,1 
a very small space is reserved for 'ancient• history, while the major 
portion will be devoted to those areas and men of the early modern and 
modern period who most concretely influenced process-thought. The chap- 
1This section deals primarily with the configurations of metaphy- 
sical thought. A more detailed discussion of the relationship between 
this enterprise and theology is to be found in Appendix A. 
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ter will include a brief history of the development of process theology 
in the twentieth century. Finally, the chapter will contain Xervbrief 
biographical sketches of the two major proponents of process-thought: 
Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. 
Principle Systems 
Stephen Pepper has outlined four basic world systems in the his-
tory of philosophy- formism, mechanism, contextualism and organicism.2 
These systems, according to Pepper, are better known by other names in 
the history of thought. 
Formism is often called "realism" or "Platonic idealism." It is 
associated with Plato, Aristotle, the scholastics, neoscholastics, 
neorealists, modern Cambridge realists. Mechanism is often called 
"naturalism" or "materialism" and, by some„"realism." It is asso-
ciated with Democritus, Lucretius, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Berke-
ley, Hume, Reichenbach. Contextualism is commonly called "pragma-
tism." It is associated with Peirce, James, Bergson, Dewey, Mead. 
There may be a trace of it in the Greek Protagoras, Organicism is 
commonly called "absolute (or objective) idealism." It is associ-
ated with Schelling, Hegel, Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, Royce." 
Such hypotheses have basic inadequacies, notes Pepper, the most general 
statement of which would be that formism and contextualism lack preci-
sion, whereas mechanism and organicism lack scope.4 It would be helpful 
for this study to investigate these four options and determine into 
which categories process-thought fits. It should be noted that we are 
assuming that process-thought is an eclectic system, although it will 
demonstrate characteristics of one of these options with greater force 
2World Hypotheses (Berkeley, California: University of California 
Press, 1942). 
3Ibid., p. 141. 
4Ibid., pp. 143-6. 
than the other three. 
Formism is based on the root metaphor5  or similarity.6 In essence, 
what the hypothesis argues is that the particulars of an individual ar-
ticle or entity are such that we note certain basic agreements in char-
acters. That is to say, within certain limitations of gradations, it is 
commonly recognized that, for example, blue is blue (whether or not we 
call it navy, indigo, turquoise, etc.) and that this would suggest that 
each particulat entity that displays a blue sensation participates with 
all other "blue" entities- that is, it has the common character "blue-
ness". This, formism suggests, indicates that the sensate realization 
of blue in a particular individual is merely a subjective realization 
within that individual of an objective reality, namely "blueness". The 
5Ibid., pp. 84-114. The root metaphor method is outlined by Pepper 
thus: 
A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to 
its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common-sense fact 
and tries if he cannot understand other areas in terms of this one. 
This original idea becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor. He 
describes as best he can the characteristics of this area, or, if 
you will, discriminates its structure. A list of its structural 
characteristics becomes his basic concepts of explanation and de-
scription. We call them a set of categories. In terms of these cat-
egories he proceeds to study all other areas of gact whether uncrit-
icized or previously criticized. He undertakes to interpret all 
facts in terms of these categories. As a result of the impact of 
these other facts upon his categories, he may qualify and readjust 
the categories, so that a set of categories commonly changes and 
develops. Since the basic analogy or root metaphor normally (and 
probably at least in part necessarily) arises out of common sense, 
a great deal of development and refinement of a set of categories 
is required if they are to prove adequate for a hypothesis of un-
limited scope. Some root metaphors prove more fertile than others, 
have greater powers of expansion and of adjustment. These survive 
in comparison with the others and generate the relatively adequate 
world theories, (pp. 91-91) 
6Ibid., pp. 151 ff. 
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character (ideal), "blueness," is something other than the conglomer- 
ate of all blue articles. "Blueness" is, in effect,-,a reality beyond 
those particulars. 
By extension, therefore, formism woulf argue that when a signif- 
icant number of particulars participate in a character, that character 
must be seen as an external reality to each particular. Accordingly, 
there are several basic principles of existence- "blueness,'!"fatness," 
"chairness," "human-ness" -which are the bases for perceived reality. 
Pepper notes that formism lacks precision,7 the point at which, I con-
tend, is precisely at the issue of how these multiple principles inter-
relate to form "blue chairs" or "fat men." Is there a basic principle? 
It would appear not. 
"The root metaphor of mechanism is a machine."8 That said, it is 
necessary to show how the analogy works. Two kinds of mechanism are 
discernible in the history of systematic philosophy- discrete and con-
solidated. Mechanism postulates primary categories (field of location, 
primary qualities, and primary laws) and secondary categories (second-
ary qualities, a principle connecting the two categories, and secondary 
laws).9 Discrete mechanism assumes "that many of the structured features 
of nature are loosely, or . , .exyernally related."10 
 It works primari- 
ly with particles of reality in the spatiotemporal arena. Consolidated 
7Supra, p.8, note 4 
8Pepper, p.186, 
9Ibid., pp. 191-4. 
10,1)id., p. 195. 
11 
mechanism is more concerned "to describe to us the unique structure of 
the spatiotemporal whole."11 
In short, what these two forms of mechanism hope to show is the 
total working of the machine (consolidated) and the workings of its 
cogs (dicrete). Its lack of scope is .a serious problem. In dealing with 
primary categories, it tends to overlook the secondary categories. It 
is precise in detailing interrelationships, but narrow in what consti-
tutes a property of primary concern. Is creativity, for example, a vi-
able option for a primary category? It would appear not, since this is 
inexplicable in terms of fields of location or primary laws. This lack 
of scope seriously hinders mechanism from describing the fullness of 
reality. 
Contextualism is a bit more difficult to describe briefly because 
it, like organicism, is a synthetic rather than analytical system.12 
The root metaphor of contextualism is the historical event.13 "By his-
torical event, however, the contextualist does not mean primarily a 
past event, one that is, so to speak, dead and has to be exhumed. He 
means means the event alive in...its present."14 The basic categories of 
contextualism are change and novelty which are exhibited in the categor- 
liIbid., p. 212. 
12
Ibid., p. 142. A synthetic theory is one which deals primarily 
with contexts and complexes and views analysis as derivative. An analy-
tical theory is one which deals with the nature of elements and facts, 
while regarding complexes as derivative. 
13Ibid., p• 232. 
14Ibid. 
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les of quality and texture. By quality and texture, the contextualist 
means "the spread of an event, or its so-called specious present, its 
change, and its degrees of fusion.. . .the strands of the texture, its 
context, and its references."15 The spread of an event is the duration 
over which it exhibits itself. For example, I might argue that I am 
writing this passage in one moment. But the fact is that there is no 
single moment for the completion of this complex activity. A matter of 
seconds, at least, is needed. But a sentence can be written over a long 
period of time; I write a part of it, go get a drink of water, write a 
few more words, light my pipe, and then finish it. The writing of the 
sentence can be seen as one event interrupted by several others, the 
spread of which interruptions often determine the finished product of 
this sentence. This clues us as to what change is. When I sat down to 
write, I had no intention of engaging in all those other activities, but 
I altered significantly that intention. And as that intention was al-.. 
tered so was the activity of the writing. But as another (or even my-
self at a later time) looks at at the sentence, he cannot discern that 
this was the product of such a multiplicity of events. This is what is 
known as fusion. 
The texture of the event has strands. The strands of the event of 
writing the sentence above are the writings of the various phrases of it 
as well as the activities that accompanied and interrupted the writing. 
These interruptions could also be seen as the context of the writing. 
The strands are but details of the context, a delineation of it. The 
15Ibid., p. 236. 
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context, in this case, was my study; but it might well have been a lib-
rary, the living room with the television blaring, a bus station, etc. 
The context seeks to describe the locale and other considerations that 
affect the change and bring it about. The references are references to 
these strands and context. Reference might be linear (writing, drinking; 
pipe-lighting in that succession), convergent (that which sees that the 
activities aformentioned are not similar, but when undertaken to inter-
act, they have a similarity in that event), or instrumental (writing 
the sentence was the primary activity, the other events merely contrib-
uted to it).16  
With such description, the contextualist is thus concerned with 
synthesizing all events of history into such a whole. He analyzes the 
constituent elements that make up the "one" event, but in so analyzing, 
his goal is to show the configuration of the event and the why of its 
change. He is synthesizing the event from these components. In so doing, 
the contextualist gives away considerable precision because, in so com-
bining the events, he must relegate certain components to a secondary 
position, a practice which could be dangerous in the light of reexamina-
tion. 
Organicism shares much in common with contextualism, but 
organicism has to deal mainly with historical processes even while 
it consistently explains time away, whereas contextualism has to 
admit integrative surrounding and extending through these struc-
tures endanger its categories. Organicism takes ime lightly or 
disparagingly; contextualism takes it seriously.-(  
16Ibid., PP.  237-263. 
17Ibid., pp. 280-1. 
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"The organicist believes that every actual event in the world is a 
more or less concealed organic process,"18 The task, therefore, is to 
discern what that process is. In accomplishing this task, the organicist 
uses various categories. 
These are: (1) fragments of experience which appear with (2) nex-
uses or connections or implications, which spontaneously lead as a 
result of the aggrevation of (3) contradictions, gaps, oppositions, 
or counteractions to resolution in (4) an organic whole, which is 
found to have been (5) implicit in the fragments, and to (6) trans-
cend the previous contradictions by means of a coherent totality, 
which (7) economizes, saves, prp-Rerves all the original fragments 
of experience without any loss.' 
Point (4) above is the pivotal point in that around it the entire sys-
tem hangs and has its meaning. If there is not a whole, then there are 
unresolved contradictions in the reality of things and the fragments of 
experience are capable of being lost. 
The Hypothesis of Process-thought 
The cursory examination above of the four major world systems leads 
us to ask into which category process-thought rightly belongs. It should 
be noted that Whitehead refers to his system as "organism"20 which would 
suggest that process should rightly be called organicism. However, 
Whitehead uses the categories of other systems so extensively, and bor-
rows from the men associated with those systems so frequently, that such 
an evaluation ought to wait for a delineation of these uses, Hartshorne 
18 Ibid. 
19Ibid., p. 283. 
20PR, passim. 
15 
calls his system "neoclassical metaphysics"21 and his borrowing from 
such men as Bergson and Peirce would suggest that he would fit into the 
school of the contextualists. If both these men are to be considered as 
process philosophers, it is necessary to find a category into which 
they both can fit. 
Pepper notes contextualism and organicism share much in common. He 
says "it is tempting to regard these two theories as species of the 
same theory, one being dispersive and the other integrative."22 This 
may give us our handle, but we cannot use the terms that Pepper has em-
ployed; a new name is necessary. In using a new name I recognize that I 
am engaging in eclecticism, which Pepper finds untenable.23 The name I 
should like to use is process-thought,24 chosen because it meets the 
criterion of describing the organicism of Whitehead and because it fits 
the logical concerns of Hartshorne. 
Process-thought, hereafter to be shortened to process, is an eclec-
tic enterprise. It uses organicism quite extensively; one might even 
argue that this is the basis of the system. It is heavily engaged with 
contextualism. But it also borrows from formism and mechanism. From 
formism one can see the attention given to classes in logical argumen-
tation concerning perfection; the notion of deity in process also seems 
21Hartshornet passim. Especially, LP, passim. 
22Pepper, p. 280. 
231bid., p. 104 ff. 
24This name, "Process-thought" is from Norman Pittenger, Process-
thought and the Christian Faith (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968). 
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to carry a formistic attitude.25 From mechanism, process has taken the 
concern with a total description of the spatiotemporal whole. It would 
now be most helpful to see in what way these borrowing have been made 
and how they affect the system. 
Precedent Philosophies 
Because of the vast amount of material with which both Whitehead 
and Hartshorne work, it would be outside of the limits of this paper to 
give a detailed analysis of the way in which they use other schemes in 
developing their own. We shall content ourselves with looking at the 
major influences that these two have themselves indicated. 
Whitehead expresses a great deal of dependence of seventeenth-cen-
tury thought.26 He devotes approximately forty pages to Locke, Hume, 
Descartes, and Kant in Process and Reality, the summary of which would 
appear to be this. From Hume, Whitehead has excerpted the notion of re-
petition, and the way in which it is affected by feeling. From Locke, 
Whitehead has taken the concern with the idea, but has reconstructed 
this thought to make it more tenable. 
(Locke) writes: ". . .and ideas become general by separating from 
them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas 
that may determine them to this or that yarticular existence." 
Here, for Locke, the operations of the mind originate from ideas 
'determined' to particular existents. This is a fundamental prin-
ciple with Locke; it is a casual concession to the habits of lan-
guage with Hume; and it is a fundamental principle with the phil- 
2 5This may explain the critique leveled against Whitehead that his 
notion of God is little more than an addendum to his metaphysics. See 
Chapter III, Section I of this study. 
26PR, p. 198 ff. 
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osophy of organism.27 
Further explaining the way in which process borrows from Locke, White- 
head writes 
Locke's principle amounts to this: That there are many actual ex-
istents, and that in some sense one actual existent repeats itself 
in another actual existent, so that in the analysis of the latter 
existent a component 'determined'to' the former existent is dis-
coverable. The philosophy of organism expresses this principle by 
its doctrines of 'prehension' and of 'objectification.'2  
The influence of Descartes is perhaps best described as a negative 
force. Whitehead is quite concerned with Cartesian principles, especial-
ly as they have been incorporated into scientific thought, but his con-
cern is such that it leads him to refute many of the principles which 
Descartes employed. 
Descartes asserts one principle which is the basis of all philo-
sophy: he holds that the whole pyramid of knowledge is based upon 
the immediate operation of knowing which is either an essential 
(for Descartes), or a contributary, element in the composition of 
an immediate actual entity. This is also a first principle for the 
philosophy of organism. But Descartes allowed the subject-predicate 
form of proposition, and the philosophical tradition derived from 
it, to dictate his subsequent metaphysical development. For his 
philosophy, 'actuality' meant 'to be a substance with inhering 
qualities.' For the philosophy of organism, the percipient occasion 
is its own standard of actuality. . . .Descartes' notion of an un-
essential experience of the external world is entirely alien to 
the organic philosophy.29 
With Cartesian categories, science worked and developed a split universe. 
The universe was split in two: there was the world outside, a world 
from which science had banished all things of the spirit; and there 
was a world inside, and world of thought, feeling, and perception. 
27Ibid„ pp. 209-210. 
28Ibid., p. 211. 
29Ibid., pp. 219-220. 
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Descartes gave this split official status in philosophy. Reality, 
he said, is divided into extended substances (bodies) and thinking 
substances (minds1 and neither type of substance involves the 
other in any way. 
Against this understanding, Whitehead postulates "that neither physical 
nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together."31 The 
Cartesian dualism was impossible for Whitehead because it failed to take 
into account the fullness of reality. In much the same way that White-
head argued against the Newtonian scientific outlook, he refuted the 
Cartesian philosophical understandings upon which that Weltanschauung 
was based. 
The influence of Immanuel Kant on Whitehead is likewise primarily 
negative. The Kantian notion of the objective as a construct of the 
subjective is a misconception, according to Whitehead. In this, Hume 
and Kant are philosophical brothers and equally rejected by Whitehead 
and process. The doctrine maintains that there are actually two worlds 
again. "one world of mere appearance, and the other world compact of 
ultimate substantial fact."32 
Whitehead summarizes his being influenced by seventeenth-century 
philosophers thus: 
We have now come to Kant, the great philosopher who first, fully 
and explicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act 
of experience as a constructive functioning, transforming subject-
ivity into objectivity, or objectivity into subjectivity; the 
order is immaterial in comparison with the general idea. We find 
the first beginnings of the notion in Locke and in Hume. . . .The 
30Eugene Peters, The Creative Advance (St. Louis: The Bethany Press, 
1966), p. 31. 
311fiT, D. 175. 
32PR, p. 231. 
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full sweep of the notion is due to Kant. The second half of the 
modern period of philosophical thought is to be dated from Hume 
and Kant. In it the development of cosmology has been hampered by 
the stress laid upon one, or other, of three misconceptions: 
The substance-quality doctrine of actuality. 
(ii) The sensationalist doctrine of perception. 
(iii) The Kantian doctrine of the objective world as a construct 
from subjective experience. 
The combined influence of these allied errors has been to recuce 
philosophy to a negligible influence in the formation of contem-
porary modes of thought,33 
 
On a more contemporary scene, the influences upon Whitehead seem 
to be the scientific theory of quantum physics and the philosophical 
writings of Henri Bergson, From the quantum theory, Whitehead found his 
tool for attacking the static concepts of Newtonian physics and Carte-
sian philosophy. Introduced to the scientific scene was now a notion of 
novelty and chance which could easily relate itself to creativity. Fur-
ther, because laws now were seen as no more than statistical probabili-
ties and not unbreakable maxims, the influx of non-material influences 
on reality was now a real possibility, From Bergson, Whitehead found a 
philosophical concept of processual time and intuitive function. Berg-
son's philosphy is far more influential on Whitehead's than Whitehead 
admits. The Bergsonian scheme, therefore, demands far more than cursory 
examination. 
Of ultimate importance to Bergson is a differentiation between 
"physical time," that which is measured by a clock and is the subject of 
scientific mathematical conception, and "pure time" (duree reelle),  
33Ibid., pp. 236-7. 
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which is the flow of time.34  This is unmeasurable, because the mea-
surement of time is but an abstraction of the concrete reality. This 
sounds very much like Whitehead's conception of time.35 
Another feature of Bergson's thought that seems to influence 
Whitehead greatly is the notion of intuition. Bergson argues that man 
has two capacities- intellect and intuition. The one, intellect, uses 
symbols, remains outside of what it knows and produces a knowledge that 
is only relative to some viewpoint. The other, intuition, enters into 
what it knows, does away with symbols and produces and absolute know-
le4ge.36 While Whitehead has extended this principle to all entities, 
whereas Bergson regards it solely as a human function, this notion 
sounds significantly like Whitehead's 'prehension.' Especially since 
Bergson regards intuition as a social activity, that is more exhibit-
able in the social animals; Whitehead, too, regards prehension as more 
demonstrable in the social animals. 
Further points of comparison are on the general agreement between 
Bergson and Whitehead on the general metaphysical enterprise- the turn-
ing over of mechanistic and materialistic emphases. Bergson's doctrine 
of creative evolution is quite compatible with Whitehead's insistence on 
the factor of creativity in the world. FUrther, Bergson's vital impetus 
(elan vital) and original impetus of life (un elan original de la vie) 
sound very much like Whitehead's subjective aim. 
4 3 
. T. A. GoUdge, "Henri Bergson," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.', 
Edited by Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 287-8. 
35William W. Hammerschmidt, Whitehead's Philosophy of Time (New 
York: King's Crown Press, 1947). 
36Goudge, p. 291. 
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It is quite possible that Whitehead and Bergson developed sep-
arately, but it is more likely that Bergson influenced Whitehead, since 
Whitehead quotes him, although sparingly. 
Turning our attention to the other major proponent of process, 
Charles Hartshorne, we find very much the same precedents, but influ-
encing him in other ways. The very name that Hartshorne gives to his 
enterprise, neoclassical metaphysics, would suggest that the classical 
metaphysicians were highly influential in his development. This is the 
case, but, as with Whitehead, the influence of Kant, Hume, Locke, and 
Descartes is more negative than positive. Hartshorne's purpose appears 
to be to overthrow the critiques these men leveled against classical 
metaphysics and to reconstruct a metaphysics in the classical vein that 
would answer the objections and presuppositions of these giants. Since 
we will be focusing on his answers to these critiques in the section 
dealing with his system, we shall not deal with them here. 
A further influence on Hartshorne was the phenomenology of Edmund 
Husserl. This is not a major influence on Hartshorne, but Huuserl's 
work on psychologism seems to have set the stage for Hartshorne's first 
book, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation. A more significant 
influence was the work of Charles S. Peirce. Of probable influence here 
is Peirce's stress on logic,37 a concern with which Hartshorne is highly 
involved. Peirce divides logic into three Tarts- speculative grammar, 
critical logic, and speculative rhetoric.38 These divisions are readily 
37Fi.ederick Copelston, "The Philosophy of C.S. Peirce," A Histo 
of Philosophy, Vol. VIII (Garden City, New York: Image Books, -1 ,pp. 
65-66. 
381bid. 
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discernible in Hartshorne, especially in his use of logic in defense of 
theism and ontology. Peirce's metaphysics are a strange blend of various 
strands, but that strand which denotes metaphysics as "the absolute ac-
ceptance of logical principle not merely as regulativelt valid, but as 
truths of being,"39 seems to be the same metaphysical principle as Hart-
shorne's procedure of arguing away all possible objections to his meta-
physics by reduction to absurdity or logical impossibility of the other 
side. Hartshorne has also stated that Peirce's influence on him was to 
give him a better model of nossibility. than did Whitehead. 
Which brings us to the greatest and most obvious influence on 
Hartshorne, Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead's effect is such that the 
two are practically to be considered a unit in philosophical thought. 
From Whitehead, Hartshorne found an ally in speculative philosophy in 
an age of positivism. It might be said that Hartshorne is the logical 
advocate for Whitehead's system. I think it would be more productive 
to note that whereas Whitehead's major concern is with cosmology, Harts-
horne's is with ontology within the same area. 
A Short History of Process Theology41 
Within the first few years following Whitehead's Science and the 
39Hartshorne, Charles and Paul Weiss, ed., The Collected Papers of 
Charles S. Peirce,1.487, cited in Copeiston, p, 7 T7 
40Eugene Peters, Hartshorne and'NeocIassical Metaphysics (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska. Press, 1970), p. 9. 
41
The information for this section drawn from Delwin Brown, "Recent 
Process Theology," Journal of the American Academ of Reli on, XXV, 1 
(March, 1967), pp. 28-41. and Naibert 0. So e er,"TES eve opment of 
Process Theology," Unpublished lecture delivered at Concoria Senior Col-
leg, Ft. Wayne, Indiana, Spring, 1969 (mimeographed). 
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Modern World and Religion in the Making, process-thought suffered 
quite heavy- opposition in theological circles. Both from the right and 
from the left, theologians attacked the new philosophy as demonstrating 
a misconception of God and evil and rejected it as a supercilious 
attempt at theological bombast at a time when suffering was at a peak. 
However, some significant theologians viewed it as a worthwhile enter-
prise. Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, found it to be a much needed 
emphasis for modern religion. Within the decade, Whitehead was finding 
considerable acceptance among American and British theologians. 
One of the first attempts to use Whitehead was by Lionel Thornton 
in his The Incarnate Lord, an attempt at a very supernaturalistic 
christology. Later, and more widely read, was William Temple's Nature, 
Man and God, which quoted Whitehead extensively, but, in the end, re-
jected his view of God. In the United States, most significant of the 
Whiteheadians was Henry Nelson Wieman, who was attracted, most of all, 
to Whithead's view of God as the principle of concretion. During the 
rest of the thirties, Whitehead' seemed to fade in theological circles. 
In the forties, the attention given to Whitehead was primarily an 
analysis of whether or not Whitehead's notion of God was available for 
religious purposes. The rejection of that possibility came first from 
sometime theologian , Walter Lippman, who, in his A Preface to Morals, 
argued that Whitehead's God, for the purposes of religion, is no God at 
all. This debate was culminated by a critical examination by Stephen Lee 
Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God, which argued that, 
because a conception of God suitable for religious purposes would allign 
the divine purpose with human good, Whitehead's God does not fill that 
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purpose because Whitehead's God is above the human good and only enjoys 
the results of the human good and does not contribute to it. Reactions 
to Ely were many. Victor Lowe argued that Ely had not refuted White-
head's God but a misunderstanding of that God, More complete was Ber-
nard boomer's response, which tried tried to circumvent the difficul-
ties in understanding the natures of God. Loonier argued that there is a 
mutual interaction between God and humanity (and the rest of the world) 
which makes both man and God mutual benefactors and beneficiaries. 
One man, perhaps more than any other, made Whitehead's philosophy 
open for theological purposes- Charles Hartshorne, In his defenses of 
not only Whiteheadian interpretation, but also for metaphysics as the 
only key for future theology, opened the door for other men to develop 
process theologies. His major contribution to the early debate, Beyond  
Humanism, argued that the Whiteheadian notion of God is not only avail-
able for religious purposes, but is actually more compatible with the 
Gospel witness concerning God than is the medieval interpretation of 
God as an unchanging absolute. Later, in Man's Vision of God and the 
Logic of Theism, Hartshorne maintained that the process concept of 
perfection, that God is surpassable by none other than himself but does 
surpass himself, does more justice to religion than does the old concept 
of an unchanging and unchangeable God. 
With Hartshorne's contributions far from over, these early contribu-
tions allowed others to ezcpand and build on the process scheme. John B. 
Cobb, in his A Christian Natural Theology, argues with Hartshorne that 
the notion of change in God is essential for religion. Bernard Meland, 
recognizing the element of secularization in the world, proposes that 
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process offers the key to religiously interpreting the world while 
maintaining a secular stance. Daniel Jay Williams, in The Spirit and 
the Forms of Love, developed a Christian ethic based of process prin-
ciples. 
 
All these were augmented by William Christian's definitive work on 
Whitehead, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics. In the final 
section of this book, Christian explains with more clarity than any 
other previous writer the relationship between God and the world. Chris-
tian's work is regarded as one of the best systematic treatments of 
Whitehead's thought, and is a strong argument for religious us of 
Whitehead. 
Some other attempts to move beyond the notion of God in process 
to other articles of Christian faith include Norman Pittenger's Process-
thought and the Christian Faith, which outlines a short chistology and 
anthropology; Peter Hamilton's The Living God and the Modern World 
which likewise offers a christology; and most recently, Charles Curtis' 
The Task of Philosophical Theology, which has offered very brief accounts 
of the relationship between process philosophy and points of Christian 
doctrine. 
Alfred North Whitehead: A Short Biography42 
Alfred North Whitehead was born in Ramsgate, England on February 6, 
1861. His father was a clergyman of the Church of England, as well as a 
42
The information for this section was drawn from Norman Pittenger, 
Alfred North Whitehead (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1969), pp. 1-9, 
and Alfred North Whitehead, "Autobiographical Notes," The Philosophy of 
Alfred North Whitehead, Paul Schlipp, editor,(Chicago: Northwestern Uni-
versity Press, 1941), pp. 1-1k. 
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schoolmaster on the outskirts of Ramsgate. It was from his father that 
Whitehead received his early education in both Latin and Greek. At the 
age of fourteen, he was sent to Sherburne, a boy's school, where he 
continued in Latin and Greek and began studies of the Roman and Greek 
historians. It was here, too, that his interest in mathematics had its 
start, an interest that was later to consume most of his energy. In 
1880, he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where he centered his stud-
ies entirely on mathematics. In 1885, Whitehead was admitted as a fellow 
of Trinity. That same year he married Evelyn Wade, with whom he shared 
a serenely happy marriage which produced three children. 
In 1898, Whitehead's first book, A Treatise on Universal Algebra, 
was published. He tells us that it was based on the work of earlier 
mathematicians, who were later to affect his mathematical thinking. 
This work led to his election to the Royal Society in 1903. Whitehead 
had plans for a second volume, but never published it. Rather, when he 
read Bertrand Russell's The Principles of Mathematics, also a first vol-
ume, and discovered that his and Russell's prospects for continued vol-
umes were identical, they merged their efforts, and after eight years 
finished their work on Principia Mathematic/. In 1910, Whitehead moved 
from Cambridge to London, that same year publishing An Introduction to 
Mathematics. From 1911 to 1914, he held several positions at University 
College of London, and from 1914 to 1924, a professorship at the Imper-
ial College of Science and Technology in Kensington. In 1924, Whitehead 
retired from the faculty of Cambridge University, upon which he received 
an invitation to teach at Harvard, which he accepted. Prior to his leav-
ing London, he published The, OoncePt of tiatuie,i,ifill 1920 and, in 1922', 
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The Principle of Relativity. 
Curing the years at Harvard, he published Science and the Modern  
World (1925), Religion in the Making (1926) and Symbolism: Its Meaning  
and Effect (1927), which was based on lectures he delivered at the Uni-
versity of Virginia. In 1928, he published a collection of essays under 
the title, The Aims of Education. The following year, he produced his 
greatest metaphysical work, Process and Reality, which was the result 
of the Gifford Lectures which he delivered on a return to the British 
Isles at the University of Edinburgh. In 1929, The Function of Reason  
appeared, and four years later, Adventures of Ideas. His last book, 
Modes of Thought, was published in 1938, nine years before his death 
on December 30, 1947, at the age of 86. 
Charles Hartshorne: A Short Biography43 
Charles Hartshorne was born in Kittanning, Pennsylvania on June 5, 
1897. His father was the rector of the Episcopal church in Kittanning. 
Hartshorne attended school at Teates School, five miles outside of Lan-
caster, Pennsylvania, where he matured intellectually and had his first 
contact with the theory of evolution. It was here that he found an in-
terest in birds, the study of which was his constant avocation through-
out his life. 
At the age of eighteen, Hartshorne entered Haverford College, but, 
during his sophomore tear, withdrew and joined in World War I in France 
as an orderly at a hospital on the Normandy coast. Upon his return, he 
43
The information for this section dxawn from Eugene Peters, Harts-
horne and Neoclassical Metaphysics, pp. 1-14. 
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enrolled at Harvard University in 1919, and two years later received his 
B.A., the bulk of his work done in philosophy. He continued at Harvard 
and received his M.A. in philosophy in 1922, and the following year, 
after a concentrated effort, his Ph.D. in philosophy, 
Hartshorne was regarded as one of the most brilliant students at 
Harvard, and for the year 193-24 was awarded a Sheldon Traveling Fellow-
ship, which he used at the University of Freiburg, where he heard Edmund 
Husserl and Martin Heidegger. His fellowship was renewed and he remained 
in Germany, but now at Marburg, to where Heidegger had transferred. In 
1925, he returned to Harvard, where he was assigned the task of col-
lecting the papers of C.S. Peirce. During the next three years, he de-
voted himself to this task, and, together with Paul Weiss, then a grad- 
uate student who joined him on the project in 1927, he finished and pub- 
lished the collected works between 1931 and 1936, Most of the work had 
been done when Hartshorne left Harvard to assume a position on the fac- 
ulty of the University of Chicago in 1928, That same year he married the 
former Dorothy Cooper, a union which produced one daughter. 
In 1955, Hartshorne left the faculty of Chicago to become professor 
of philosophy at Emory University, While yet at Chicago, he had traveled 
to the International Congress of Philosophy at Oxford, after which he 
and Mrs. Hartshorne toured Europe while he gathered material for his 
first book, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, which was pub-
lished in 1934. During the next years, he accepted several guest lec-
turships, including positions at Stanford University, the New School 
for Social Research, and Goethe University. In 1952, he was the Ful-
bright lecturer at the University of Melbourne. He remained at Emory 
for seven years, and then he joined the faculty at University of Texas. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PROCESS METAPHYSICS 
It is becoming increasing clear that what systematic theology 
needs is a new mode of presenting the truths of the Biblical witness, 
It is also clear that philosophical frameworks dating from the fif-
teenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and even nineteenth centur-
ies are simply rejected by twentieth-century man, and, accordingly do 
not assist in the task of presenting theological truths. What appears 
to be necessary is a twentieth-century philosophy that fills the need 
of being, at least, capable of appeal to modern man and of being sym-
pathetic-to, if not compatible with, theological concerns. There are 
many who find that need fulfilled in process-thought. 
Process is the only current option in philosophy today that deals 
with metaphysics and is truly a twentieth-century philosophy. Existen-
tialism, phenomenology, and classical metaphysics are still around but 
they are basically products of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Twentieth-century philosophy has concentrated primarily on linguistic 
analysis, positivism, and logic. Only process, together with some in-
sights from such men as Teilhard de Chardin and the American pragma-
tists, is consistently concerned with world systems in this century. 
Accordingly, process offers, at least in its program, a new possibility 
for theological use. 
To understand that possibility, it is necessary to understand the 
("N	 system and method of process-thought. The purpose of this chapter is to 
analyze the process scheme upon which some theological notions can be 
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built. We shall endeavor to present, as cogently as possible, the sys-
tems and arguments of the two major proponents- Whitehead and Hartshorne-
and try to discover what insights they have to offer. 
Process According to Whitehead 
Whitehead was convinced that, contrary to the scientific outlook 
of Newtonian physics and Cartesian philosophy, the world is not a mul-
tiplicity, but a unified whole. His purpose was, therefore, to show 
that unity, which led him to conceive of the world as a society made:up 
of many but in such a way that the: many were the one and the one was the 
many. No part of the society was excluded from the whole; all inter-
worked to produce and sustain one another. 
Whitehead thus presupposed three things. First, there was an ele-
ment of enjoyment in experience, not only at the human level, but at 
all levels. Second, this enjoyment is achieved, that is, there is an 
aim to life. Third, there is creativity, or a self-making aspect to ex-
istence.1 With these presuppositions, Whitehead intends to describe the 
whole of experience. Cobb remarks that three avenues were open. 
First, one can understand matter as an appearance to the mind. The 
justification for this view is that when we consider carefully the 
basis of our notion of matter it turns out to be entirely a func-
tion of sense experience. . . .The second solution to the problem 
of dualism took . . .materiality as its clue and held that minds 
are functions of matter. . . .But total materialism is difficult 
to accept as total mentalism. .Hence, a third alternative com-
mends itself; namely, to subsume the duality under some more-com- 
1Norman Pittenger, Alfred North Whitehead (Richmond, Va.: John 
Knox Press, 1969), pp. 14-15. 
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prehensive unity. This might mean that some kind of reality under-
lies our subjective mental states as well as that which seems ob-
jective to them; it might mean that all reality participates2in 
both mentality and materiality without in fact being either. 
It is quite obvious that Whitehead chose the third option. It is inter-
esting to note, however, why he rejected the other two. While the first 
option would allow for one of his major concerns, creativity, it does 
little to explain actuality. Whitehead was convinced that the world was 
real, not merely appearance.3 The second option would have denied crea-
tivity, since it is a deterministic view of mental function. According-
ly, he had little choice but the third option. 
In so choosing, and so designating his ultimate category as crea-
tivity, Whitehead then sets to establish three other categorical class-
es: existence, explanation, and obligation.4 A lengthy quote is here 
needed to give the full force of what Whitehead is endeavoring to 
acheive. 
There are eight Categories of Existence: 
(i) Actual Entities (also termed Actual Occasions), or Final Real- 
ities, or Res Verae. 
ii) Prehensions, or Concrete Facts of Relatedness. 
iii) NeXils (plural of nexus), or Public Matters of Fact. 
iv) Subjective Forms, or Private Matters of Fact. 
v) Eternal Objects, or Pure Potentials for the Specific Determina-
tion of Fact, or Forms of Definiteness. 
(vi) Propositions, or Matters of Fact in Potential Determination, 
or Impure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Hatters of 
Fact, or Theories. 
vii) Multiplicities, or Pure Disjunctions of Diverse Entities. 
viii) Contrasts, or Modes of Synthesis of Entities in one Prehen-
sion. 
2John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 195), pp. 24-25. 
3William A. Christian: 
 An Interpretation  pf Whitehead's Metaphysics  (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Yress, Iy)97;" pp. 6-y. 
211, p. 30. 
Among these eight categories of existence, actual entities and eter-
nal objects stand out with a certain finality. 
There are twenty-seven Categories of Explanation (of which some are): 
(i) That the actual world is a process, and that the process is the 
becoming of actual entities. . . . 
(ii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, the potential unity 
of many entities- actual and non-actual -,acquires the real unity 
of the one actual entity; so that the actual entity is the real 
concrescence of many potentials. 
(iii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions, 
nexus, subjective forms, propositions, multiplicities, and con-
trasts also become; but there are no novel eternal objects. 
(iv) . . .it belongs to the nature of a 'being' that it is a po-
tential for every 'becoming.' This is the 'principle of relativ-
ity.' 
(v) That no two actual entities originate from an identical uni-
verse. . . .The eternal objects are the same for all actual enti-
ties. . . . 
(vi) That each entity of the universe of a given concrescence can 
. . .be implicated in that concrescence in one or other of many 
modes; but in fact it is implicated in only one mode . . . 
This indetermination, rendered determinate in the real concrescence, 
is the meaning of potentiality. . . . 
(vii)That an eternal object can be described only in terms of its 
potentiality for 'ingression' into the becoming of actual entities; 
and that its analysis only discloses other eternal objects. . . . 
(viii) That two descriptions are required for an actual entity: (a) 
one which is analytical of its potentiality for 'objectification' 
in the becoming of other actual entities, and (b) another which is 
analytical of the process which constitutes its own becoming. The 
term 'objectification' refers to the particular mode in which the 
potentiality of one actual entity is realized in another actual 
entity. . . . 
(ix) That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual 
entity is. . . .This is the 'principle of process.' 
(x) That the first analysis of an actual entity . . .discloses it 
to be a concrescence of prehensions. . . .All further analysis is 
an analysis of prehensions. 
(xi) That every prehension consists of three factors: (a) the 'sub-
ject' which is prehending, namely the actual entity in which the 
prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is prehend-
ed; (c) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject prehends 
that datum. Prehension of actual entities . . .are termed 'physi-
cal prehensions'; and prehensions of eternal objects are termed 
'conceptual prehensions.' 
(xii) That there are two species of prehensions: (a) 'positive 
prehensions' which are termed 'feelings,' and (b) 'negative pre-
hensions,' which are said to 'eliminate from feeling.' 
(xiii) That there are many species of subjective forms, such as 
emotions, valuations, purposes, adversions aversions, consciousness, 
etc. 
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(xxi) An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself. 
By this is meant that an actual entity functions in respect to 
its own determination. . . 
There are nine Categoreal Obligations: subjective unity, objective 
identity, objective diversity, conceptual valuation, conceptual re-
version, transmutation, subjective harmony, subjective intensity, and 
freedom and determination.6 This lengthy quote, incomplete even at 
that, stresses the major points of Whitehead's program. In the 
succeeding pages, we shall with the categories of existence quite 
heavily, while showing where the categories of explanation and ob-
ligation are significant. 
'Actual entities,' or 'actual occasions,' "are the final real 
things of which the world is made up."7 They are infinite in number, 
and encompass the entirety of reality. They are experienced things, as 
well as experiencing; they form and are formed by other actual enti-
ties. 
As subjects, actual entities experience in 'affective' fashion.8 
Whitehead puts it 
I find myself as essentially a unity of emotions, enjoyments, 
hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions -
all of them subjective reactions to the environment as active in 
my nature. . . .The individual enjoyment is what I am in my role 
of a natural activity, as I shape the activities of the environ-
ment into a new creation, which is myself at this moment; and yet, 
as being myself, it is a continuation of the antecedent world. If 
we stress the role of the environment, this process is causation. 
5Ibid., pp. 32-35. Italics original. 
6Ibid., pp. 39-42. 
7Ibid., p. 27. 
8A.H. Johnson, Whitehead's Theory of Reality (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1962), p. 16. 
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If we stress the role of my immediate pattern of active enjoyment, 
this process is self-creation. If we stress the role of the con-
ceptual anticipation of the future whose existence is a necessity 
in the nature of the presentA this process is the teleological aim 
of some ideal in the future.' 
Johnson notes five claims that are being made in this statement concern-
the nature of a subject: 
(a) The content of a subject's experience is chiefly, though not 
exclusively, affective; (b) it is a unity of its component parts; 
(c) a subject has its environment active in its nature; (d) it 
becomes what it is as the result of its subjective reactions to 
the data provided by its environment; (e) a subject selects data 
from its environment in accordance with a conceived idea1.1° 
This reaction to the environment is what is called 'prehension.' Two 
kinds of prehension are possible- positive and negative.11 A positive 
prehension is the grasping of data into the life of the actual entity 
to produce concrescence.12 Rejection of data is called a negative pre-
hension.13 When the process is completed, that is, when concrescence 
has been acheived, Whitehead calls this satisfaction.14 
Prehensions can also be divided along another plane- conceptual 
and physical. Conceptual prehension is when an actual entity prebends 
an eternal object as something that might be applicable to it. It does 
9MT, p. 60. 
10Johnson, p. 17. Italics original. 
11Supra., p. 32. Category of explanation (xii). 
12PR, p. 321, 
131bid., P. 35. 
14 p. 38. 
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not necessarily embrace the eternal object in toto; rather, it reacts 
to it out of its own subjective form. An example might help illustrate: 
When I am angry, that is a subjective feeling; it is within me; it is, 
to a degree, produced by me. But anger can be seen as an eternal ob-
ject. Therefore, I have, in agreat sense, positively and conceptually, 
prehended that eternal object. But my anger is different than another's. 
I yell, fume, fuss and expend myself quickly; my wife, on the other 
hand, when angry, will brood, seclude herself from others, and retain 
the anger for a long period of time. Both my own and my wife's subjec-
tive form readjust the prehended eternal object so that it matches what 
we are as actual entities. To cite a non-human example, an angry dog 
needs, in most cases, a physical provocation for its anger, whereas I 
often react angrily to verbal provocation, and very often to non-ver-
bal feelings. Thus, by comparison between the dog and myself, we both 
exhibit varying subjective forms in our anger. 
Subjective form has two meanings in Whitehead: in some instances, 
it appears to be an attitude or emotional reaction, as he cites anger, 
horror, disgust, enjoyment as instances of it;15 elsewhere, it has a 
deeper meaning, the private side of the actual entity, which includes 
a pattern of quality and intensity.16 Quality here means the components 
of the actual entity which make it react as it does; intensity means 
the relative strength with which any one quality influences the reaction.17 
151bid., pp. 35, 37, 338, 479. Also, AI, pp. 236, 309. 
16.Ibid.., P. 444. 
17Ibid., pp. 357-8. 
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These, in turn, relect on the valuation that the actual entity makes 
of each prehension. Qualitatively, it determines how the eternal ob-
ject is to be used; intensively, it determines the importance of the 
use.
18 
Subjective form presupposes a subjective aim. Subjective aim might 
best be described as the overriding principle of the actual occasion. 
Every actual entity has a purpose which defines what it shall become 
in its full realization of its satisfection.19 That is to say, every 
actual entity has an ideal which is established for it and with which 
it concurs. The aim of the entity is to realize that ideal; that is its 
subjective aim. An illustration might prove helpful. A rabbit is an act-
ual entity, and its aim is to become an oak tree.20 It is a fact of the 
universe that the rabbit cannot become a tree immediately. Consequently, 
it must prehend certain eternal objects and other actual entities to 
achieve its aim. In this case, the eternal objects would appear to be 
such things as brownness, furriness, breathing potential (on the rabbit's 
existent pole) and hardness, fibrousness, greenness and height (on its 
potential pole). In working its way to becoming a tree, the rabbit eats 
a carrot, digests it through its tract, defecates unusable portions of 
18
This occurs when the actual entity is faced with a complex 107  
hension (one involving more than one eternal object). The qualitative 
aspect is referred to as the Category of Subjective Harmony; the inten-
sive, the Category of Subjective Intensity. (PR, p. 41) 
19Satisfection and aim appear to be fairly synonomous in Whitehead. 
20
I am sure that Whitehead would rebel at such an instance being a 
true form of subjective aim, but this will suffice for our purpose of 
illustration. 
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the carrot which becomes fertilizer for the oak tree, the nutriments of 
which are absorbed through the rhizomes of the tree, and produce an 
acorn, which falls, is fertilized further by the same feces, and grows 
into an oak tree. Thus, the rabbit has physically prehended other actual 
occasions of carrot, tree, ground, feces and acorn to acheive its sub-
jective aim. 
Some interesting insights can be gleaned from this rather frivo-
lous illustration. First to be brought to mind is the question of caus-
ation. From a materialistic point of view, our illustration has nothing 
to do with prehension, but simple cause and effect. But from the process 
point of view, there is no simple, one-to-one cause and effect,21 but 
a multiplicity of causal integrations among actual entities. The second 
consideration brought forth from our illustration is the autonomy of 
actual entities. 
It is to be noted that every actual entity . .is something in-
dividual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of ac-
tuality. And also it is to be noted that every actual entity . . . 
is a creature transcended by the creativity which it qualifies. . . 
it is causa sui. To be causa sui means that the process of concres-
cence is its own reason for the decisiRn . . .by which any lure 
for feeling is admitted to efficiency.42  
That is to say, from a process point of view, no actual entity so af-
fects another so as to cause it to change without that second entity 
creating some subjective reaction to the change. The universe is free 
and creative, not dictated and mechanistic, 
21mT
, p. 225. 
22PR, p. 135. 
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Of supreme importance to be noted from our illustration is the con-
cept of time involving actual entities. No actual entity can affect an-
other until it has ceased as a subject, that is, it must be past for 
the prehending entity. In our case, this is a little hard to see. It 
would have been better had we said that the rabbit died and decomposed 
to fertilize the tree. But our illustration, as it stands, shows that 
past means, not as existent, but as subject. That portion of the rabbit 
(the feces) which became tree was no longer subject, but still actual. 
It had become, instead, superject. The superject phase of actual enti-
ties is that which is prehendable by other actual entities.23 The sub-
ject-superject actual entity rabbit yeilded an portion of its super-
ject phase to the ground for the subject-superject tree to utilize. 
This, then, appears to be the essence of actual entities: they are 
the real things of the universe which interact with one another to pro-
duce one another. That interaction, however, is a creative process by 
which each actual entity prehends another (or more) and utilized it for 
its own becoming, or achievment of subjective aim. They also prehend 
eternal objects, to which we turn our attention now. 
The actual entities, we have seen, are essentially of the nature 
of passing things. . . .An actual entity is an event that happens 
but once and is never repeated. . . .But although an actual entity, 
in its concrete particularity, is not found elsewhere and at any 
other time away from its own place and time of occurence, it hap-
pens under aspects of characters that are everywhere and always the 
same. . .These characters are ordinary called universals, but 
Whitehead calls them "eternal objects. 
"Ibid., p. 71. 
24
Rasvihary Das, The Philosophy of Whitehead (New Yorks Russell & 
Russell, 1964), p. 43. 
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Whitehead coins the term to avoid misconceptions that such equivalent 
terms as ideal, or universal, bring forth. Whitehead criticized Raton-
is idealism for absorbing actuality into possibility.25 He criticized 
Locke for performing the opposite of absorbing possibility into actual-
ity.26 Whitehead feels that his notion of eternal objects will avoid the 
absorbtion of the one into the other in any way. 
This, then, begs the question of how eternal objects are related to 
actual entities. It must first be reiterated that eternal objects are 
pure possibility in that they do not describe any particular state of 
affairs, actual or hypothetical. There are impure potentials, proposi-
tions, which describe a hypothetical state of affairs. Further, there is 
real potentiality, which is relative to some particular state of affairs 
or actual world.27 Again it would be helpful to illustrate. Whitehead 
himself gives several examples of eternal objectss sensa (e.g. green, 
blue), subjective species (qualities of shape, intensity, happiness), 
objective species (e.g. mathematical forms), objects designated by 'any;' 
etc., patterns and relationships, the abstract essence of an actual en-
tity, general principles, and forms of imperfection.28 It would be bet-
ter.; 
 however, were we to cite a case. One obvious eternal object of the 
first order would be the notion of perfection. Hartshorne's defense of 
perfection as a necessary existent is a prime case of proof for the re- 
2 5Christian, p. 197. 
26PR, p. 211. 
27Christian, p. 201. 
28Ibid., pp. 202-3. 
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ality (here used in a non-technical sense) of eternal objects.29 Per-
fection, as Hartshorne shows, is not easily demonstrable; it is a prime 
eternal object for it does notmeed a particular referent to prove its 
potentiality. An example of an impure potential would be the case of, 
say, the Celtics beating the Knicks for the NBA Eastern Conference 
championship, although they are down in the series three games to one. 
Hypothetically, this is possible. But the real possibility is that the 
Knicks will win that championship. 
Our concern here is with pure potentiality and how it relates to 
the actual entity. Primarily, eternal objects transcend actual entities, 
all actual entities, including God. This occurs in three ways: first, 
eternal objects are timeless; actual entities are temporal. This means 
that eternal objects neither actual become nor do they cease, Further, 
this means that eternal objects are unaffected by their ingression into 
the actual world. Second, eternal objects are indeterminate; actual en-
tities are determinate. Third, eternal objects are abstract; actual en-
tities are concrete.30 
But, on the other hand, eternal objects are immanent to actual en-
tities. This occurs through ingression. 
I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection with 
each such occasion, which I term its mode of ingression into that 
occasion. Thus an eternal object is to be comprehended by acquaint-
ance with (i) its particular individuality, (ii) its general rela-
tionships to other eternal objects as apt for realisation in actu- 
29LP, p. 51. 
3°Christian, pp. 204-5. 
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al occasions, and (iii) the general principle Mich expresses 
its ingression in particular actual occasions, 
these modes of ingression are explained thus: 
An eternal object can only function in the concrescence os an actu-
al entity in one of three ways: (i) it can be an element in the de-
finiteness of some objectified nexus, or of some single actual en-
tity, which is the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in 
the definiteness of the sunjective form of some feeling; or, (iii) 
it can be an element in the datum of a conceptual, or proposition-
al feeling. All other modes of ingression arise from integration 
which presuppose these modes.32  
Mode (i), dative ingression, means, as far as I understand it, that what 
is prehended of one actual entity by another (or of a nexus by an actual 
entity) is transmitted through eternal objects. They are the key for the 
passing on of the prehension. Node (ii), subjective ingression, means 
that the prehending actual occasion has qualities (eternal objects33) 
which influence its prehension, in its subjective form, and these are 
conditioned by the ingression of other eternal objects. Mode (iii), con-
ceptual ingression, means that in this prehension, the qualities of the 
prehended occasion or nexus are brought into play by the ingression of 
the eternal objects that qualify that occasion or nexus. 
It may have been good to place at this point Whitehead's doctrine 
of God. However, in the interest of time and space, we shall refrain 
from making that presentation here, and shall work with it quite fully in 
the next chapter. One note ought to be made here, however. The relation- 
31PR, p. 440. 
32 Ibid., p. 445. 
33Christian, p, 189. 
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ship between actual occasions and eternal objects seems to hang in the 
concept of the relationship between the Primordial and Consequent 
tures of God. Hopefully, this unity will be clearer as the next chap-
ter unfolds. 
Process According to Hartshorne 
Hartshorne has largely been overlooked by historians of philoso-
phy for his unique contributions to philosophy. He has, for the most 
part, been considered only as a student of Whitehead, although often 
cited as Whitehead's best student. At times he has been shown only as a 
student of Peirce, whose papers and letters he collated. Hartshorne is, 
nonetheless, a significant philosopher in his own right. It might be 
said that, beyong being only a student of Whitehead, he was the finisher 
of Whitehead's work. Whitehead's system is based almost entirely on cos-
mology. He is, to large extent, an empiricist. If Whitehead is the cos-
mologist, Hartshorne is the ontologist. While Hartshorne works with em-
piricism, his major focus is on logical principles and primary state-
ments. His is a more a priori system. 
Metaphysics may be described as the study which evaluates a priori  
statements about existence. A priori is here used in . , .Tthe) 
sense of contradicting no conceivable observation. . . .I do not 
restrict the observations to those which human beings might per-
form. However, human beings must be able to conceive the observa-
tions. I hold that we can in principle conceive- though not imag-
ine -eperiences radically different from any we could possibly 
have.34  
Hartshorne calls his method "neoclassical metaphysics", and perhaps it 
would be best to start with that term. 
34CSP, P. 19. 
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Classical metaphysics is said to have begun with the Greeks; it 
ended with Kant and Hume, who offered devastating critiques of those 
metaphysics. However, neither Kant nor Hume offered any alternatives. 
Hartshorne proposes to do just that. He offers the following definitions 
of metaphysics to do it: 
a The unrestrictive or general theory of concreteness; 
b The theory of experience as such; 
c The clarification of strictly universal conceptions; 
d The search for unconditionally necessary or eternal truths 
about existence; 
e) The theory of objective modality; 
f) The theory of possible world-states, or the a priori approach 
to cosmology; 
g The general theory of creativity; 
h The search for the common principle of structure and quality; 
i Ultimate or a priori axiology (theory of value in general); 
j) The inquiry into the conceivability and existential status of 
infinity, perfection (unsurTassability), eternal and necessary 
existence; 
(k) The rational or secular approach to theology.35 
Definition (a) has to do with the relationship between abstraction 
and concreteness. Like Whitehead, Hartshorne believes that much of the 
history of thought has misplaced concreteness in abstraction. To refute 
this, Hartshorne argues that " the concrete is greater than and includes 
the abstract."36 This means, first of all, that abstraction is only demon-
strable in concrete examples, because the concrete is real, not the ab-
straction. Second, this means that one might describe what concrete enti-
are and ar like. Hartshorne states that they are real, changeless, and 
immortal.37 They are real in that they are the stuff of experience. One 
35Ibid., p. 24. 
361Ralph E. James, The Concrete God (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1967), P. 58. 
37Ibid., pp. 58-62. 
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does not experience the abstract; the abstract is conjectured. Concrete 
entities are experienced as they occur and thus form the basis for real-
ity.38 The concept of changelessness does not mean that concrete entities 
do not change; it means, rather, that whatever change occurs in them is 
not strictly to be accorded on the basis of an outside influence. They 
are what they do, and change is an internal, self-created function of 
concrete entities.39 Concrete entities are immortal in that once: they 
cease in physical existence, they continue in memory.40 
Definition (b) includes theories regarding memory, perception, and 
imagination,41  concerning which Hartshorne notes 
In studying memory, perception, or imagination one needs to dis-
tinguish between:(1) What is observably present in the experience; 
(2) wt is not observably present; and (3) what is observably ab-
sent. 
In so doing, Hartshorne himself has come up with the following observa-
tions. 
A person experiences, at a given moment, many things at once, ob-
jects perceived, past experiences remembered. That he perceives 
certain objects and remembers certain things, we can more or less 
explains the objects are there, the experiences are recent and con-
nected by associations with the objects, and so on. But an exper-
ience is not fully described in its total unitary quality merely by 
specifying what it perceives and remembers. There is the question 
38CSP, p. 140 ff. 
39James, p. 58-62. 
4°Ibid., p. 61. This sounds as if Hartshorne is here reiterating 
the Whiteheadian notion of the consequent nature of God, but he is also 
including a human element to this. 
41
OSP, P. 75. 
42Ibid., p. 79. 
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of how, with just what accent, in just what perspective of rela- 
tive vividness and emotional colouring, the perceiving and re-
membering are done. 
Let me restate the basic argument: the stimuli molding an experi-
ence are many; the five or more senses are operating, memory is 
relating us, at least unconsciously, to thousands of incidents of 
the past: but all this multiplicity of influences is to provide a 
single unitary experience. . . .The effect is one; the causes, how- 
ever, are many. . .This vast multitude of factors must flow to-
gether to produce a single entity, the experience of the moment. 
The many stimuli are given, and they certainly tell us much about 
the response. But it is logically impossible that they should tell 
us all. An emergent synthesis is needed, to decide just how each 
item is to blend in a sin
g
e complex sensory-emotional-intellect-
ual whole, the experience. 3  
Definitions (c) and (d) are closely intertwined in Hartshorne. His 
method is to seek (d) by (c) through the process of reducing statements 
to absolute negation.44 The process is this: given two statements (or 
more) about an eternal truth, one subjects them to the severest of tests 
which include falsifiability and expressions of possible negations. If 
one of the statements should yeild itself to negation, it cannot be a 
metaphysical truth. "Metaphysical truths may be described as such that 
no experience can contradict them, but also that any experience must il-
lustrate them."45 "We recognize a metaphysical truth by this, that in 
any situation it applies directly . . .and involves exclusion of nothing 
(besides nonsense)."46 
Definition (e) has to do with necessity and contingency. Hartshorne 
4 3Ibid., p. 4-5. 
44Eug ene Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics (Lincoln, 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), pp. 15-28. 
45LP, p. 285. 
46Peters, Hartshorne and Neoclassical Metaphysics, p. 21. 
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offers many answers to these considerations and in a variety of ways. We 
shall consider one of these in the next cahpter when we speak of the nec-
essary_existence of God. A summary statement of his position would seem 
to be that modality is not merely logical or linguistic, but also onto-
logical.47 His theory of objective modality includes the notions of cre-
ativity, perfection and concreteness; all these included in the class of 
necessary existents. 
Definition (f) has to do with alternative (although not necessari-
ly existent) modes of being- that is, could things have been other than 
they are? Hartshorne tends to answer this question in the negative; but 
he maintains that any metaphysics must offer its propositions in such a 
way and with such clarity that the possible alternatives conceivable (a-
gain not imaginable) are included in its categories.48 This also includes 
the ontology inherent in cosmology, about which we shall speak momentari-
ly. 
Definition (g) is one of Hartshorne's primary concerns. With White-
head, he is ernestly trying to develop a philosophy of creativity. 
Moral freedom as we all know requires the exercise of rational re-
flection and decision; but what many philosophers fail to see is 
that this exercise of higher powers involves a creative leap be-
yond anything made inevitable or predictable by the causal condi-
tions. The creative act is influenced by its conditions, and re-
quires them, but it cannot (I wish to argue) be required or pre-
cisely determined by them. . . .This aspect of creativity is what 
the determinist overlooks or denies.49 
CSP, p. 29. 
48Ibid.,  p. 25. 
4914P, P. 164 
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This feature of Hartshorne's thought is of primary importance because it 
plays such a significant role in his refutation of the critics of classi-
cal metaphysics. He maintains that such men as Kant and Hume present a 
deterministic view that is absurd because (1) it cannot deal with the 
novelty which is demonstrable even in scientific theory (the notion of 
the uncertainty principle of quantum physics establishes this); (2) it 
leads to the denial of anything really existing ("If becoming does not 
create new quality and quantity, new determinateness, then, we argue, it 
creates nothing, and nothing ever really becomes."); (3) it is essential-
ly statistical, and not empirical ( as its proponents erroneously assume); 
(4) it separates too exclusively randomness or chance and moral freedom; 
(5) it tends to confuse generality with particularity to the extent that 
it assumes certainty in prediction rather than probability, which is, in 
truth, unpredictability; (6) it confuses ignorance with the inability to 
predict; and (7) it confuses logical and physical determination or im-
plication.5°  
Definitions (h) and (i) share a common goal of determining what is 
good, valuable, etc„ and from whence those values come., Hartshorne's 
answer to these considerations is that the basic value is experiencing, 
which leads to beauty, goodness, and truth.51 
Definition (j), closely related to (e), is a major concern for 
Hartshorne. He has devoted considerable time and energy to the proofs 
5 °Ibid., pp. 165-75, 
51CSP, p. 303 ff, 
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of perfection as existent, which may account for his including this as 
a separate consideration. It is very much involved with objective mod-
ality. 
Definition (k) is, perhaps, where Hartshorne is most concerned to 
expend his metaphysical energies. It is also the point at which we are 
most concerned with his insights.52 
If these are the tasks of metaphysical enquiry, what are the prin-
ciples that govern the way in which they shall be approached? Harts-
horne offers several general principles, which appear irrefutable. First, 
the consideration of language must be taken into account.53 This includes 
recognizing the difference between 'ordinary language' and 'technical 
language.' Terms must be lucid and capable of being understood; further, 
because metaphysics deals with questions not ordinarily asked, and be-
cause it works with such vast generalities, it must pay more attention' 
to extreme cases than does other'language use. Second, metaphysics must 
take into account the fullest spectrum of experience that is available.54  
Thit would imply that metaphysics must pay close attention to other dis-
ciplines and be particularly aware of cultural differences. Thirdly, met-
aphysics must pay strict attention to logic.55 Fourthly, the metaphysi-
cian must be amply familiar with the history of philosophy, no just in 
52Note Appendix A. 
53CSP, pp. 71-75. 
54Ibid., pp. 75-81. 
55Ibid., pp. 82-85. 
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terms of the men involved, but with the history of thoughts and con-
cepts.56 This is important for two reasons: it gives the metaphysician 
a better grasp of the problem with which he is dealing, and it enables 
those who come to evaluate his work a better tool by which to do it. 
To these rather general principles, Hartshorne adds four more 
specific principles. The "principle of least paradox"57 argues, as its 
name suggests, that, where one may see paradoxical statements, that 
which involves the least possibility for contradiction is preferable, 
The "principle of inclusive contrast"58states that "ideas express con-
trasts," which is to say that included in such notions as reality, con-
creteness, subject, etc. are their opposites unreality, abstraction, ob-
ject, etc. But contrasts must not be confused with dualism (e.g. con-
crete-abstract, subject-object, relative absolute) which would posit a 
third entity out of the two. Hartshorne contends that the inclusive con-
trast is not a duality. The "principle of generality"59 argues that any 
concept that is qualified by a special case must be made more generally 
applicable before it is suitable for metaphysical use. For example, the 
notion of experience cannot be limited to human experience alone; it 
must embrace the whole of reality, including animals, rocks and toad-
stools. The "principle of balanced definiteness"60 suggests that the use 
56Ibid., pp. 85-88, 
571bid., pp. 88-89. 
5 8Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
59Ibid., pp. 90-92. 
6oIbid., pp. 92-97. 
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of language in metaphysics must take into account the possibility that 
it is one-sided in its presentation of the truth, which would suggest 
that it must seek to establish the other sides and round out the state-
ment to embrace the whole truth. For example, the statement, "We call 
the Unmoved Mover God,"(Aquinas) must be balanced by the issues of 
whether or not this is in fact what men have worshipped throughout his-
tory, or is it an abstractional theory unrelated to religious practice? 
This does not beg the question of truth in the statement (equating the 
two notions), but it seeks the balance of equating this with what is 
commonly held. 
With these principles in hand, Hartshorne's system intends to find 
the metaphysical truths, that is, those truths which are incapable of ne-
gating anything but nonsense. We have already shown what Hartshorne con-
siders some of these truths to be: the fact of creativity in the universe, 
the notion of concreteness, the existence of perfection, and the notion 
of being as becoming. Some further exploration of these is in order to 
better understand his thinking. 
We have noted the notion of creativity in Hartshorne only on the 
basis of what it allows him to refute. The notion, in and of itself, is 
worth more investigation. We will hold off here referring to the creative 
aspects of God, reserving that for our next chapter. What we are concerned 
with now is the general notion or concept of creativity. Creativity is a 
basic factor of all existence and reality. Hartshorne notes that this 
notion of creativity has never been seriously considered as a first prin-
ciple, until Whitehead.61 It is a first principle for Hartshorne, which 
61Ibid., P. 1. 
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leads him to refer to his metaphysics as being a "philosophy of shared 
experience." This notion of sharing has not been explored heretofore. 
Individuals create for themselves; that is, there is not absolute de- 
termination as each entity creates a new form out of the so-called de-
termining factors. 
Sharing of creativity is the social character of experience, its 
aspect of sympathy, identification with others. Moreover, even 
one's past is, strictly speaking, 'another'. . . .The most obvi-
ous aspect of this is memory. In memory one takes account of one's 
previous decisions as relevant to the present decision. One par-
ticipates or shares in past experiences, with their creative de-
cisions. One also remembers past perceptions of how others thought 
and felt, and what they decided. Or one perceive now what they in 
the approximate present think, feel, and decide.u2  
All nature, according to Hartshorne, is of this social crasis. 
Human nature is social through and through. All our thought is 
some sort of conversation or dialogue or social transaction. 
Now, further, not simply man, but all life whatsoever, has social 
structure. . . .And the higher one goes on the scale, the more ob-
viously do-the social aspects assume a primary role. 
Logical analysis shows, according to such high authorities as 
Whitehead and Peirce, that the "social" in its most general sense 
is definable as the synthesis of all the universal categories. It 
is the union of absolute and relative, independent and dependent, 
freedom and order, individual and universal, quality and structure, 
and so on. A nonsocial conception is only arrived at by reducing 
some category to zero case. 
This social conception will play an important role in our discussion of 
God in the forthcoming chapter. 
One short note on the modal quality of perfection. His often-criti-
cized proof for the existence of perfection64 reveals more of Hartshorne's 
62Ibid., pp.  7-8. 
63DR, pp.  27-28. 
6141P, PP. 50-57. 
52 
method than is first recognized. Here, we have a strict adherence to 
logical considerations; we have a clarification of a universal concept; 
there is the search for unconditionally necessary truth. Indeed, one can, 
in these few pages, see Hartshorne touch upon six of his eleven defini-
tions of metaphysics (c, d, e, h, j, and k). 
How Whitehead and Hartshorne Relate 
We have noted both men's systems, and certain relationships be-
tween the two are Quite obvious. No more succint statement of the rela-
tionship is available than Hartshorne's own: 
I came to Whitehead already convinced that experience is essential-
ly participation, that any reality we can conceive must be consti-
tuted of feelings in some broad sense,-that reality is creative 
process and the future is open even for God . . .that metaphysical 
freedom is real. . . ,Whitehead began to influence me strongly at 
the same time as Charles S. Peirce . . .and it is not easy to dis-
entangle their influences. . . .One effect of Whitehead was in 
making me aware of the ambiguities in the notion of predication as 
applied to enduring individuals or "substances." 
The sources of my ideas about God are in good part elsewhere, 
though I enormously admire Whitehead's discussions of the theistic 
problem. 
Whitehead's views on "matter," the mind-body relations, perception, 
and causation have influenced me greatly. It is his, an not 
Kant's "answer to Hume" that I have found intelligible.uL-)  
These relationships between the two are merely external. The true rela-
tionship consists in the way in which the one implements and complements 
the other. 
We stated that Whitehead was the cosmologist, Hartshorne the onto- 
65
Philosophical tions, Sydney and Beatrice Rome, editors 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and litinston, 1964), pp. 323-4. 
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logist.66 A further exploration of that theme is in order. By comology, 
we mean the attention to empirical details as a basis for philosophical 
discussion. Whitehead seems to fill that bill with his focus on the sci-
entific theories of quantum physics. In this sense, Hartshorne would 
deny Whitehead the appellation "metaphysician," since he contends there 
are no empirical metaphysics.67 However, Whitehead does not only deal 
with empirical cosmology, he deals with the ontological structure of 
things. It is a matter of emphasis and origination. Hartshorne is the 
ontologist (relatively speaking) because his appeal to cases is less 
frequent and his argumentation is strictly from a priori principles. 
We have stated that Hartshorne was the defendant of Whitehead. 
This is not to imply that Hartshorne was concerned to shore up some of 
Whitehead's weak arguments; indeed, where Whitehead is weak, Hartshorne 
leaves him in search of better arguments. But Hartshorne has supplied 
the logical proofs for much of what Whitehead describes, and, in so doing, 
has made Whitehead's a better and more readily understandable position. 
The differences between the two are not readily discernible. We 
shall see the differences in the theistic discussions at that point. 
Some notable differences are in terms of Whitehead's concept of eternal 
objects. Hartshorne remarks that he is more impressed by Nominalism or 
anti-Platonic arguments than was Whitehead.68 Further, 
66Supra, p. p. 22. 
67CSP, p. 29. 
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gharles Hartshorne, "Comment," in ene Peters, The Creative 
Advance (St. Louis: The Bethany Press, 1966 , p. 139. 
Actuality is "incurably atomic" or discrete, says Whitehead, and 
rightly so. But possibility, in its pure or eternal form, is, as 
Peirce insists and Whitehead seems at times to forget, essentially 
continuous. Hence it is misleading to talk of "eternal objects" as 
though this were a definite plurality.t is a continuous matrix 
out of which all plurality is created.69 
These points of difference aside, the thoughts of these two men present 
a significantly unified whole which seem, at face value, highly applic-
able to theological use, 
691bid. 
CHAPTER IV 
SOME PROCESS-THEOLOGICAL NOTIONS 
It is somewhat difficult to keep a line on the theological aspects 
of a philosophical scheme without engaging in strict philosophy. In this 
chapter, we shall attempt to develop a plausible theological framework 
from process-thought. At points, we will simply be rehashing what the 
process philosophers have already said on the point. When this is the 
case, we shall offer a critique, not of the philosophical or metaphysical 
worth of those statements, but of their relationship to theologically 
conservative points of view. In those instances where we have developed 
additional tenets to those already established by Whitehead and Harts-
horne, we shall so indicate and critique our own as well as their posi-
tions. In several instances, we have no statements from either man on 
the topic under consideration, and have had to extrapolate a position 
from the general process mold. In those cases, critiques are difficult; 
but we shall at least point out the difficulties inherent in the devel-
opment, both from the point of view of process and theology. 
The Doctrine of God ( Theology ) 
Trying to find a beginning point for the process concept of God is 
no easy task, Both Whitehead and Hartshorne have expended considerable 
energy on the topic, and virtually all the major points they bring forth 
ought to be considered. For no other reason than the fact that the ques-
tion of God's existence seems of primary importance, we begin with Harts-
horne's development of that point. 
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Hartshorne begins with one of the major contibutions to classical 
metaphysics- Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God. In 
so doing, he must attempt to reinterpret that argument in the light of 
his own neoclassical metaphysics. To accomplish that, he must take ser-
iously the objections raised against the classical notion and forms of 
the argument. 
The standard view of the argument is that Anselm is analyzing a 
purely mental conception and drawing the implications within it. This 
opens the argument to various criticisms: 
1. Anselm's initial premise that the mind begins by thinking a 
legitimate idea is challenged. . . .Since it refers to nothing in 
our sensory experience, are we really able to "think" of some-
thing when we hear Anselm say, "that than which nothing greater 
can be conceived"? 
2. Let it be granted that Anselm's phrase does convey an idea to 
us. This may still be what Descartes calls a "factitious" idea, 
wholly made up by our minds and unrelated to anything in reality. 
3. Let it be granted that this is a valid idea. Still, how can 
Anselm expect that everyone will identify it with God? . . .He 
should not claim that anyone who hears his words will automatic-
ally understand what God is. 
4, Let it be granted that men might identify this idea with God. 
. . .Any proof that claims to begin with some "idea" of God, 
which can readily communicate in a few words, shows by that very 
fact that it is not dealing with God at all. 
5. Let Anselm be granted his starting point, a genuine, thinkable 
definable idea of God. . . .How can he prove God's existence from 
an idea of God which he himself has selected for this purpose? 
All he has done .is to adopt an idea that simply pre-empts 
the whole question of existence. . .This is not to prove any-
thing, but to move in a vicious circle, where the matter is set-
tled by fiat. God is defined in terms of an idea that closes the 
question of existence even before it is opened. 
6. Let it be allowed that men have an idea of God and can argue 
from it. . .(S)ince we must go beyond our concept of anything in 
order to be able to ascribe existence to it, no rational analysis 
of our idea of God eill ever yeild a knowledge of his existence. 
Every ontological proof is fallacious, 
7. Let it be granted that we do have an idea of God and can think 
of his existence. All that Anselm's argument shows is not that God 
exists, but that our minds must think that he exists if they are 
to hold to this idea of him with logical consistency. . . .What 
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Anselm has done is simply to confuse the necessity of drawing an 
inference (logical necessity) with the necessity of objective ex-
istence ( ontological necessity).1  
Now these comprise a strong case against the ontological argument as it 
has been understood la its opponents. Hartshorne is convinced that, 
first, this form of the argument is invalid (or at least weak), and, 
second, that all those who have refuted Anselm have not read his full 
argument. Hartshorne contends that Anselm's significant contribution to 
theism is not this argument, but one which is largely overlooked. 
This second or stronger version is: To exist necessarily is better 
than to exist contingently; hence the greatest conceivable being 
can exist only necessarily. Moreover, whatever could be necessary 
is necessary ("reduction principle" of modal logic); hence to say 
that God does not exist necessarily is to say that he could not do 
so, and since he also could not exist contingently, it is to say 
that he could not exist at al1.2  
Hartshorne feels that now, at least, we are dealing with Anselm at his 
best. What remains now is to show that this concept of God is neither 
contradictory nor lacking in significance. He acheives the first by his 
now classical (in a non-technical sense) proof, which runs: 
The logical structure of the Anselmian argument, in its mature or 
"Second" form, may be partially formalized as follows: 
'q' for '(3 x) Px' There is a perfect being, or perfection exists 
'N' for 'it is necessary (logically true) that' 
'00 for 'it is not true that' 
'v' for 'or' 
'p4 q' for 'p strictly implies q' or 'N (p & q)' 
1Arthur C. McGill, "Recent Discussions of Anselm's Proof." in 
The Many-Faced Argument, edited by John Hick and Arthur C. McGill (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 34-36. See also Hartshorne's 
list of twenty objections to the proof, LP, pp. 45-47. 
2
Hartshorne, "What Did Anselm Discover?" in The Many-Faced Argu-
ment, p. 322. See also AD, pp. 33-34. 
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1. q-, Nq 
2. Nq v N Nq 
3. ") Nq -+ N..► 
 Nq 
4. Nq v Nea Nq 
5. lie) Nq Nr4 q 
6. Nq v NeJq 
7. . .I N^Jci 
8. Nq 
9. Nq.qpq 
10. q  
"Anselm's Principle": perfection could 
not exist contingently 
Excluded Middle 
Form of Becker's Postulate: modal stat- 
us is always necessary 
Inference from 2,3) 
Inference from 1): The necessary fal- 
sity of the consequent implies that of 
the antecedent (Modal form of modus 
tollens) 
Inference from (4,5) 
Intuitive postulate (or conclusion from 
other theistic arguments): perfection 
is not impossible 
Inference from (6,7) 
Modal axiom 
Inference from (8,9)3 
 
Now Hartshorne insists that this is an extremely hard argument to refute. 
One may reject it, especially at points (1,3 & 7), but this is not to 
refute it. 
The argument, and the proof by Hartshorne, is based on the follow-
ing assumptions that are drawn from modal logic: "(1) With the modality 
termed contingency, existence and non-existence are equally conceivable."4 
This means that, if God could be shown to be contingent (existentially 
so), then he could be conceived not to exist. "(2) With the modality of 
impossibility, existence is not (consistently) conceivable (example, 
round-square)."5 This means that, if the concept of God is shown to be 
impossible, so also his existence would be impossible. "(3) With the 
modality of necessity- if it be admitted that there can be such a status- 
3LP, pp. 50-51. 
4Hartshorne, "What Did Anseim Discover?", p. 326. 
51bid. 
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only existence, but not nonexistence, is conceivable."6 This means that, 
if God is shown to be a necessary being, his existence would be irrefut- 
able. Hartshorne is convinced that his proof, which equates 'q' with 
'God', demonstrates this necessary situation.?  
It may have been noticed that, in speaking of contingency, we qual-
ified it in terms of its relationship to existence. This is because Harts-
horne sees that there is a sense in which God is contingent, but not as 
it affects his existence. The contingency of God is related to his effect 
on and being affected by the world. Past metaphysics have tended to as- 
cribe to God a quality of immutability, uncausality and unsurpassability 
that touches not only his existence, but his concrete nature as well. To 
this, Hartshorne replies, "To identify God with this abstraction seems a 
philosophical species of idolatry."8 
This notion of God's contingency, which we shall investigate more 
fully further on, has close ties with the Whiteheadian interpretation of 
God. It is important to turn to Whitehead at this point because his is 
the framework around which the entire process notion fits. Whitehead has 
posited three aspects of God: his Primordial Nature, his Consequent Na-
ture, and his Superjective Nature.9 We shall consider each separately. 
6Ibid. 
?Although I hardly qualify as a modal logician, I am persuaded by 
this demonstration. For a counter-argument, see John Hick, "A Critique 
of the 'Second Argument'," in The Many-Faced Argument, pp. 341-56. 
8NT, p. 44, 
9PR, passim. 
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The Primordial Nature of God Whitehead says is "the unconditioned 
conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects."10 
This indicates that God, like man, has both a mental and a physical pole, 
he is dipolar. The Primordial Nature is this mental pole. Eternal ob-
jects, because of their nature, are extremely difficult to embrace fully 
at any given moment. It is within the nature of man that the full multi-
plicity of eternal objects is not operative; that is, man makes selec-
tions and prehends eternal objects with varying degrees of intensity. 
This is not the case with God; his valuation of eternal objects is com-
plete, 
"Conceptual valuation" is one of Whitehead's Categoreal Obligations 
which states 
From each physical feeling there is the derivative of a purely 
conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determin-
ant of'the definiteness of the actual entity, or nexus, physi-
cally felt.11  
For actual occasions, this is derivative from physical feeling. It would 
appear that, as applied to God, this notion of derivation is gone. God's 
conceptual valuation is timeless;,it is primordial.12 
Because this valuation is complete in God, it is the ordering 
principle for eternal objects. 
This final entity is the divine element in the world, by which the 
barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains 
10Ibid., p. 46. 
11
Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
12William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphys-
ics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniVersityPress, 1959), p. 2d9. 
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primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization. This 
ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity 
constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process 
exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the 
ends proper to specific types of emergent order. By reason of the 
actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each 
eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concre-
scent process. Apart from such orderings, there would be a com-
plete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal 
world.13  
Thus, the Brimordial Nature of God is what keeps the prehension of eter-
nal objects within a reasonable framework. It orders the eternal objects 
so that actual entities will have a configuration out of which to pre-
hend, rather than a morass, 
The Consequent Nature of God is what might be called his physical 
pole. This is the way in which God relates to actual entities. 
God, as well as being primordial, is also consequent. He is the be-
ginning and the end. He is not the beginning in the sense- of being 
in the past of all members. He is the presupposed actuality of 
conceptual operation, in unison of becoming with every other cre-
ative act. This by reason of the relativity of all things, there 
is a reaction of the world on God. The completion of God's nature 
into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectifi-
cation of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its 
actual world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God 14  
as a novel element of God's objectification of that actual world. 
Thus, the Consequent Nature of God suggests that God not only affects the 
world, but is affected by it. God is, thus, like every actual entity, 
The Superjective Nature of God Whitehead describes thus: 
There are four creative phases in which the universe accomplishes 
it actuality. There is first the phase of conceptual origination, 
deficient in actuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valua-
tion. Secondly, there is the temporal phase of physical origina-
tion, with its multiplicity of actualities. In this phase full 
actuality is attained; but there is a deficiency in the solidarity 
13PR, p. 64, 
14Ibid., p. 523. 
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of individuals with each other. This phase derives its determinate 
conditions from the first phase. Thirdly, there is the phase of 
perfected actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, 
without the qualification of any loss either of individual iden-
tity or of completeness of unity. In everlastingness, immediacy is 
reconciled with objective immortality. This phase derives the con-
ditions of its being from the two antecedent phases. In the fourth 
phase, the creative action completes itself. For the perfected 
actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this 
world so.that each temporal actuality includes it as as immediate 
fact of relevant experience. . . IThe action of the fourth phase 
is the love of God for the world.15  
All this means is that the world feels God's reception of it, that is, 
feels God as consequent, and consequently, feels the totality of the 
past within the divine life.16 
Whitehead summarizes his three Natures thus: 
The 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of an unity of 
conceptual feeling, including among their data all eternal objects. 
The concrescnce is directed by the subjective aim, that the subjec-
tive forms of feeling shall be such as to constitute the eternal 
objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriated for 
all realizable basic conditions. The 'consequent nature' of God is 
the physical prehension by God of actualities of the evolving uni-
verse. This primordial nature direct such perspective of objecti-
fication that each novel actuality in the temporal world contri-
butes such elements as it can to a realization in God free from 
inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance. The 'superjec-
tive ' nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of 
his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity 
in the various temporal instances.17 
Now this is not the fullest way in which we can explain Whitehead's the-
ism, To do that, we must ask some germaine questions: How does God af-
fect the world? How does the world affect God? Does Hartshorne agree 
15Ibid., p. 532. 
16Eugene Peters, The Creative Advance (St. Louis: The Bethany 
Press, 1966), p. 75, 
17PR, p. 64. 
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with these principles? 
How does God affect the world? The simplest answer to that is that 
God in himself contains all eternal objects and is himself an actual en-
tity. This means that God holds the principle of possibility for all 
actualality in the universe in that he is ghe unifying structure that 
gives each actual entity the capacity of prehending specific eternal 
objects that would be necessary for its actualization. This occurs in 
the subjective aim of the occasion. 
It should be remembered that the subjective aim is the overriding 
principle of the actual occasion that determines what its full satis-
faction shall be. But the subjective aim has an initial aim which is, as 
far as I can determine, a given from God.18 Initial aim suggests that 
God has chosen what is the best realization for_each actual entity, and 
so orders the eternal objects that that actual occasion can acheive that 
best. It supposes that the subjective aim is derived from the initial 
aim, but does not suppose that it is determined by it. 
In the first place, the initial aim so understood determines what 
locus or standpoint will be occupied by each occasion. This, in 
turn, determines just what occasions will consitute the past of 
the new occasion. 
In the second place, the initial aim also determines at what kind 
of satisfaction the occasion will initially aim and therby influ-
ences, without determining, the satisfaction actually attained.19 
18Christian, pp. 304-9. This concept of initial aim sounds very 
much like the Islamic doctine of Iktisab (the notion that God predestines 
man completely, but man concurs, albeit unconsciously) but with the 
slight difference that in Islam, God is not affected in return; here he 
is. 
1 9john B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1965T, pp. 152-4. See also Appendix C, Figure 1. 
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Thus God, in his Primordial Nature, has the function of ordering and 
establishing (might we even say creating?) the world. But the creativ-
ity that God brings into the world does not negate the creativity of 
each actual occasion. The subjective form of the occasion is autonomous, 
and accordingly makes creative decisions within the locus in which it 
finds itself. In other words, God affects the world by ordering its 
basic configurations; actual entities reform the patterns within those 
configurations. 
How does the world affect God? It must be brought forth at this 
point that God is himself an actual entity. This means that he shares 
all the characteristics of all actual entities, save one. God is the only 
actual entity that is not also an actual occasion. This means that God 
is timeless (primordial) and that he does not originate from his physi-
cal pole, as do actual occasions, but from his mental pole.20 But, in 
all other respects, God and "the most trivial puff of existence in far-
off empty space"21 react the same. 
This means, first of all, that God reacts to other actual entities. 
Thus, he has physical prehensions, must be conceded to have a subjective 
aim, and is geared toward some satisfaction. But God is a unique actual 
entity in respect to all of these. His physical prehensions are all-in-
clusive, that. is, he prehends all other. actual entities simultaneously.22 
Airther, his subjective aim is the initial aim of all other actual enti- 
20PR, p. 54. 
21Ibid., p. 28. 
22Christian, pp. 305-6. 
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ties as they emerge.23 Most importantly, his satisfaction is quite unlike 
that of other entities. First, his satisfaction is unified, that is, he 
is always satisfied at any given time.24 His satisfaction is determinate, 
so that, unlike other actual entities which perish but do not change af-
ter they perish, God changes but does not perish.25 Thirdly, God's satis- 
faction has a unique finality. It does not result in perisjing when 
achieved; nor does it demand that all entities that contribute to its 
fullness be historically past.26 The affect of the world on God, then, 
is to change him as each actual occasion perishes as sinks into his mem-
ory, or consequent nature. 
The question of how Hartshorne would view this demands far more 
space than the other two. Briefly, it can be said that Hartshorne would 
agree with Whitehead that God is a changeable being, and', in that sense, 
contingent. 
Classical metaphysics depreciated the contingent. Spinoza is an 
extreme case. But as late as Hegel, 'necessary' is a word of laud-
ation, and 'contingent', of denigration. Metaphysics seeks to know 
what it is that is necessary, or 'could not be otherwise than it 
is'. But perhaps what is necessary is precisely and solely that a 
certain ultimate form of contingency should have instances. Perhaps 
even the 'necessary being' is not one 'without accidents', but one 
which is bound to have some appropriate accidents or other. It is 
no accident that there should be accidents; rather, there are bound 
to be accidents, just as it is predictable that unpredictable 
events will never cease to occur. In the same way the divine being 
whose existence is not contingent may escape contingency only be- 
23PR, pp. 134, 343, 374; AI, p. 357. 
24Ibid., pp. 49-50; Christian, p. 295. 
2 5Christian, p. 296. 
26
Ibid., PP. 297 - 300. 
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cause, and only in the sense that, not only are accidents bound 
to occur, but divine accidents are bound to be among them. It is a 
defensible view that God is the one being to whom accidents are al-
ways bound to happen.27  
This is what Hartshorne means by a social conception of God. He argues 
that the old calssical way of looking at God, with such terms as 'immut-
able,' perfect,"absolute,' is a denial of relatively understandable 
concepts of deity. These are abstractions from older, and previous, so-
cial conceptions of God that spoke of deity in terms of assisting, lov-
ing, or knowing.28 
This social conception of God leads Hartshorne to understand the 
attributes of God relationally. For example, onmiscience, a derived ab-
straction, is nothing other than a knowing relationship with everything 
that is known to the divine mind.29 Absolute knowledge, that which sug-
gests that God knows even the unknown, is, to Hartshorne, a ridiculous 
contradiction.3° Again, the notion of omnipotence, which Hartshorne 
would call ' causal adequacy', means that God is capable of doing what-
ever is appropriate for the maximization of his satisfaction. It does 
not mean that he is capable of doing anything within his definition.31  
27CSP, p. 47. 
28DR, pp. 25-26. 
29Ibid., p. 121. 
3°Ibid., p. 124. 
31Ibid., pp. 134-8. The definition of omnipotence, as classically 
conceived, rules out the possibility of, say, God creating a stone so 
big that he could not move it. This would say that God is both omnipo-
tent and not omnipotent at the same time (p and non -p) which is logical-
ly impossible. 
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Against these classical views, Hartshorne, in much the same way as 
Whitehead, proposes that God is contingent on the world, that is, is af-
fected by it. He calls the the 'receptivity of God' which leads to his 
'enrichment',32 All this stems from his work on Anselm's ontological ar-
gument. Anselm, thinks Hartshorne, conceived of the key phrase, "that 
than which nothing greater can be conceived,"33 as meaning that God is 
unsurpassable even by himself; he could be no greater than he is. Harts-
horne contends that the better, and equally derivable, contention is that 
God is unsurpassed by others, but capable of and surpassing himself.34 
This then leads us to ask whether this God, so described by process 
thinking, is equitable to, or in any sense superior or inferior to, that 
of theological speculation and study. Hartshorne, I think, more than 
Whitehead, is aware that what he presents is not the object of worship. 
"God" properly stands for the object of worship. Can a worshipful 
deity be the object of rational analysis or demonstration? Must 
not what we analyze be an it, rather than a thou?35  
But he is insistent that the Thou includes the it, so that he feels that 
his enterprise can do nothing but assist the worshipper. The problem, 
however, is that what both are doing with the concept of God does not 
readily avail itself to the individual worshipper. Is this a serious 
drawback? 
32LP, p. 274. 
33A nselm, Proslogium, IV in SSt Anselm: Basic Writin s edited by 
S.N. Deane (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 19 pp. 9-10. 
34_ 
LP, P. 35. 
3 5Ibid., pp. 3-4. Italics original, 
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Several men have attacked both the Whiteheadian and Hartshornian 
concepts of Gos. Stephen Ely's rather langthy essay is perhaps the most 
thorough in its presentation.36 Ely contends that, if one takes the pri-
mordial nature of God, what is presented is a misconception of God. With 
the addition of the consequent nature, God appears to be somewhat more 
available for religious purposes, but not very. Three critiques of Ely's 
presentation seem to be in order, one positive, the other two negative. 
On the positive side, Ely has asked the right question of availability, 
"Is God for me?" The pro me aspect is essential if God is to be consid-
ered as anything more than a benevolent puppetmaster. However, Ely has 
missed two key points in Whitehead that lead him to answer his question 
in the negative rather than the affirmative. First, he has completely 
forgotten the 'superjective nature' of God. This would have enabled him 
to more closely relate God to the human sphere in an amiable manner. 
Second, Ely has misunderstood the quality of the primordial nature; he 
assumes that it means a past event, while Whitehead insists that it is a 
present, as well as a past, quality. 
I contend that both Whitehead and Hartshorne have presented very 
available Gods. They have managed, more than others, to balance trans-
cendence with immanence so that neither overtakes the other. In so doing, 
they have resolved a nagging paradox that has been more of a hinderance 
than help to theological interpretation. 
Further, Hartshorne's theistic proof, and their attendant logic, 
have enabled theology to express itself more cogently, withour resorting 
36
The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God (Eadison, Wiscon-
sin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1942). 
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to various mental gymnastics. His refutation of classical theism.con- 
tinues a necessary function in theological endeavor. His alternative 
forge a new path that can assist in making theology more palatable to 
modern, secular man. Whitehead, too, because of his close association 
with and attention to scientific enquiry has enabled metaphysics in 
general, and theology in 'particular, to regain a respectable status in 
the world of thought. 
The Doctrine of Christ ( Christology ) 
It must be pointed out from the outset of the section that neither 
Whitehead nor Hartshorne intend their systems to be Christian theologies. 
They are theists, not theologians. Consequently, with only an occasional 
aside, they have not interest in the specific doctrine of Christ. Even 
Cobb does not qualify as a Christian process theologian because he has 
not dealt with the doctrine of Christ. This section, then, must rely on 
secondary resources for its validation. 
The major concerns with which we are faced here are: Can process 
affirm the deity/humanity of Jesus? Is there a place in process for the 
atonement? Was Christ necessary? The first asks the question of the view 
that process has of Christ's person, the second asks about his work, and 
the third asks about his effectiveness. 
Can process talk about the deity/humanity of Christ? To do so, 
process would have to come to terms with what every theology has had to 
deal, namely, the possibility of deity becoming humanity. Most theolog- 
ical answers tend to assert that the only way in which this is possible 
is through a disruption of the way things should be and are. Perhaps 
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process offers a better solution. 
First, because God and man are not different in quality but only 
in intensity, process avoids the first problem of having to face a para-
dox from the outset. The concept that God is an actual entity, just as 
man is, helps process overcome an insoluable problem. Without this no-
tion, the only recourse is to fiat. Second, because of the concept of 
God valuating all eternal objects in himself, process would avoid the 
mistake of overhumanifying Jesus. To consider the humanity of Jesus 
exclusively eliminates the most potent concept of Christ available for 
religious or theological purposes. 
Some attempts to work with a process mold in the area of christ-
ology have failed to take these points seriously. Norman Pittenger, for 
example, makes the mistake of not utilizing fully the process concept 
of God as an actual entity.37 
(We) must speak of the Divine Action and the human response, or 
the human action which is correlated with and serves as an instru-
ment , . .for that Divine Action. This makes it possible for us to 
say . . .that the human life of Jesus was so one at will (that is 
to say, in the deepest intentionality of being) with God that in 
him the life of God was lived in man, by a man, and for men. . . . 
In him the image of God is emergent and manifest in full humanity. 
He is not an unrelated anomaly; he is the classic instance of the 
Divine Action in manhood.38  
This concept does justice neither to the Biblical witness nor to process 
thinking. Peter Hamilton's entire christology is a denial of the rela-
tionship between actual occasion and God.39 
37God in Process (London: SCM Press, 1967), p. 25. 
38Ibid., p. 29. 
39The Living God and the Modern World (Philadelphia: United Church 
Press, 1967), pp. 180-210. 
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Charles Curtis has presented a far more balanced theis in this 
area, and deserves some attention: 
Process theology makes the notion of potentiality basic to the 
understanding of the person and nature of Christ. He is the real-
ization of the potentialities of the past (e.g. the fulfillment 
of the promises of God under the old covenant) and the reservoir 
of the potentialities of the future ( the new heaven and the new 
earth of the new covenant). And because Christ has this relation-
ship to potentiality, he is the key to existence -human, cosmic, 
and divine.4° 
Both emphases are here present- the humanity and the deity. The deity 
is found in identifying Christ with future potentiality (similar to the 
hold on eternal objects of the Primordial Nature of God); the humanity 
is to be found in asserting Christ's mental or conceptual prehension of 
past eternal objects (thus affirming his actualization in the way in 
which all actual entities come into being). 
What is missing here, and perhaps Curtis considered it to go with-
out saying, is the physical prehension of Christ of past actual entities. 
To fully deal with this, we need a more fully developed pneumatology.41 
Suffice it to say, at this point, that the Spirit would have to be con-
sidered an actual entity (and not an eternal object) for this to take 
place. I am, of course, leading up to a process understanding of the 
virgin birth.42 I think process has definiet room for this concept, which 
in itself would make this a unique theological development of the twen-
tieth century. The process understanding of the virgin birth would in- 
40The Task of Philosophical Theology (New Yorks Philosophical 
Library, 19677pp, 43-44. 
41Infra, pp. 
423oth Pittenger and Hamilton disregard or refute this notion. 
Supra, p. 70, notes 37 and 39. 
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volve several keystone ideas from process. The first is the novelty of 
every actual entity. Normal birth processes would be considered thus: 
the emerging actual entity has about it the physical poles that will de-
termine the locus of it emergence. In common parlance, this would mean 
that every known actual entity of the human variety, or baby, has parents 
that produced it, numbering two, one female, the other male. In the case 
of this baby, actual entity, it prehended these physically and emerged 
in a pattern consistent with all other thus emerging entities. In the 
case of Christ, the novelty consisted in his prehending, not the normal 
two physical agents, but the one normal, his mother, and one unique, the 
Spirit. Now, in order for Christ to be fully human, it is necessary that 
the Spirit be an actual entity, otherwise, in contrast to other humans, 
Christ would have been the product of a physical and mental prehension 
in his existence, which would have made him quite different than human.43 
Christ is, then, to be considered an actual entity, as is God. 
Is there a place in process for the atonement? To answer that ques-
tion, we must first ascertain what we mean by the atonement. If it is 
assumed that the atonement was arestoration to God by a man that which 
was lost from God, namely his creatures, the process cannot include this. 
Nothing is lost in process-thought; it either is eternal, and thus with-
in the valuation of the Primordial Nature of God, or it perishes and in 
included in the Consequent Nature of God. If, by atonement, we mean an 
4 3Whitehead argues that the entities are the result of both physi-
cal and mental prehensions. However, I think in the case of physical e-
mergence, he would agree that it demands physical prehension alone. Con-
ceptual prehensions seem to affect the accidents of the emerging entity 
rather than its very existence. 
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alteration of man, process could handle this as a past actual occasion, 
but it hardly does full justice to the theological concept. 
The best meaning, and the one which seems to deal with both the 
process point of view and the theological concern, is that which views 
the atonement as that event which changes God on our behalf. Two assump-
tions are inherent here. First, this assumes that what is said about the 
beneficial relationship God and man (God pro me44. ) applies, from a theo-
logical point of view, to those who are called 'the people of God.' 
There is no doubt that this is a derivation of Whitehead's and Harts-
horne's intentions, but it seems necessary. Second, this assumes that 
change in God means not only progressive alteration, but reversal as 
well. 
With these assumptions, process theology would the argue that what 
Christ did was, by his death and reurrection, to change God's mind about 
us; he changed the relationship between God and man. This begs the ques-
tion of why Jesus Christ, and not some other man or even all men? 
Why was Jesus necessary? This will invlove a two-part answer; 
first, as to his necessity for being the only one through whomthis could 
occur, and, second, as to the effectiveness of this being transmuted to 
other beings. 
It could only have been Jesus because he alone was that actual en-
tity that so valuated is conceptual prehensions and was so in tune with 
his initial and subjective aims that he matched God in all things. This 
is a process way of saying that he was like us in every way except sin. 
44  Supra, p. 68, 
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Now, it would have been sufficient, from a procees point of view, to 
simply assert that God established this initial aim for Jesus, and not, 
say, Moses, and to thus point to the necessity of Jesus being the one. 
But, in stating it in the way in which we have, we have fulfilled the 
needs of theology as well. Further, initial aim is not fully determin-
ate; it demands the assent of the subjective aim, and the subjectiveform 
of that aim. Our thesis, here, has said that at no time in the existence 
of this actual entity, Jesus, did his subjective form negate his sub-
jective aim; nor did his subjective aim at any point sway from the ini-
tial aim established for him. 
The effectiveness of Jesus as the imputor of this to other actual 
entities is a little more involved. Succinctly put, it would state that 
Jesus, upon his !perishing',45 serves as so intense a physical prehen-
sion that others are conformed to him. Now this involves the understand-
ing of what faith is. In order to serve a theologically sound purpose, 
we cannot allow faith to be either just intellect or just emotivism. It 
would appear that it is most closely linked with prehension, but that 
would demand of it that it be a very special form of prehension. This is 
viable, assuming we can postulate a workable hypothesis for the Spirit 
and his guidance. That hypothesis would have to involve the Spirit, not 
only as actual entity, but also as eternal object which is so prehended 
that it excludes other prehensions contrary to it. The 'prehensive' 
faith then would be that prehension which, governed by the overriding 
prehension of the Spirit, feels Jesus to the extent that other prehen- 
45
We are not referring here to his death, but his passage from 
historical time. 
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sions, presumably and hopefully prehension of sin, evil, etc., are 
46 
negated. 
The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit ( Pneumatology ) 
We have already given some indications of what process thought 
would do with this notion. Here we shall attempt to codify that. We have 
stated that, for the rest of out theology, it is necessary that the Spir-
it be both an actual entity- and an eternal object. This would make the 
Spirit the most unique case in the process scheme. It is, I think, on 
this point that our entire theological endeavor shall hinge. If we can-
not satisfactorally accomplish the amalgamation of entity and object 
here, then our christology, ethics, ecclisiology and eschatology will be 
seriously jeopardized. 
Whitehead would argue that there is no actual entity that is an 
eternal object and the converse. This is mandatory for his system.since, 
to allow this instance, he would have to combine actuality with possib-
ility, or misplace the concrete.47 We shall overcome that concept, not 
by eradicating it, but by talking in terms of reference. That is to say, 
we shall not equate the Spirit with either actual entity or eternal ob-
ject, but shall refer to the sense in which he might be viewed as either. 
We can do this because the Spirit functions both as a subject and as a 
predicate.48 
See Appendix C, Figure 2. 
47 Christian, p. 263. 
4.8
Category of Explanation (xv). PR, pp. 35-36. 
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As subject, the Spirit is the moving force behind prehension in 
faith. He is the mover to faith. This is accomplished by his intensity 
for the given actual occasion; an intensity that is of such magnitude 
that it makes other prehended elements negative. This would suggest that, 
beyond being a single actual entity, the Spirit is more along the lines 
of a nexus. To dub him so is not to deny his aspect as actual. Thus, 
the Spirit, as subject of prehension, is that which moves to faith. 
This understanding of the Spirit does not solve any of the logical 
difficulties that ordinary theological conceptions of him contain. Those 
difficulties include the how of faith coming to an individual, the why 
of particular individuals being so graced, and the question of special 
gifts and their distribution. The first asks in what way the Spirit 
brings men to faith. To affirm that the individual seizes the Spirit for 
faith is to attribute to man participation in his salvation; it also 
begs the question of faith, for the very seizure is an act of faith. To 
affirm that the Spirit dispenses faith indiscriminately involves one in 
a battle about the love of God for the whole of humanity. The second has 
to do with why certain individuals come to faith and not others. This is 
based on the first question and is closely related to it. The third, 
which has become a thorny issue of late, asks why certain individuals 
seem to have a greater dispensation of the Spirit than do others. While 
it will not solve the other two issues, process can offer a clue to that 
last issue. It is, as are so many points in the process scheme, tied up 
with the notion of creativity. Since no entity is so causally conditioned 
that it cannot become other than the sum of the influences around it, 
that is, is creative, the gift(s) of the Spirit can be seen as such a 
creative act. This would suggest that the Spirit, as a nexus, carries 
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several available prehensions of lower intensity than the nexus as a 
whole conveys. Certain individuals, either because their subjective form 
is so ordered or because other conditions permit, are enabled to prehend 
these lower-intensity options. Others are not so enabled. 
As predicate, the Spirit become an integral part of the multipli-
city of eternal objects. That is, he reacts, as do eternal objects, upon 
each actual entity but is not included within their actuality. No man 
becomes the Spirit, and the Spirit does not become man. He remains al- 
ways Spirit. Whitehead speaks of eternal objects in much this way. This 
further would mean that the Spirit 'jumps' in and out of prehension as 
do eternal objects. Its manifestations are such that they appear constant 
throughout all time in their effects. 
Thus, we would call the Spirit an 'eternal entity,' a name which 
would combine the two aspects. Now, it can, and probably should, be 
argued that we have, in no sense, proved that the Spirit is both eternal 
object and actual entity. All we have done is to indicate the possibili- 
ty of this being so. Acceptance of this, at this point, must be based on 
intuitve feeling that this is the case, although I feel that this is yet 
capable of logical demonstration. 
The Doctrine of Man ( Anthropology ) 
Once again, we have come to a concept to which both Whitehead and 
Hartshorne address themselves, so our ground will be less shaky. We will 
concern ourselves here with the basic considerations that the two men 
have to offer in telling us about man, after which we shall raise what, 
for theology, is a most pertinent question: Is the process anthropology 
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basically optimistic or pessimistic? 
Our discussion of the process view of man will center abround the 
three traditional concepts that surround the theological concept of man: 
man as mind, man as self, and man as soul. Whitehead will serve as our 
primary source, with indications from Hartshorne forming a frame of ref-
erence for additional insights. 
Whitehead was convinced that the mind was an important part of 
man. But he was equally convinced that thought was not limited to man. 
Every actual entity has, in some sense, the ability to think. This is 
obvious from Whitehead's insistence on every actual entity prehending, 
which is not a materialistic function. It is, qualifiedly, a mental ac-
tivity. One of the functions of the mind is experience, the forms of 
which are memory, feeling and imagination.49 
The concept of self has to do with personal identity. This is 
closely tied up with the experience of memory, for I remember myself 
more concretely than any other entity. It is this memory which enables 
me to recognize myself even in the face of the fact that every hour I am 
uniquely different than before. The concept of self enables me to better 
prehend my personal past as well as that of other entities. Whitehead 
speculated that memory was to be found in the interstices between brain 
cells. The question of location is unimportant; it remains that the con-
cept of a memory assists me to relate more concretely with the totality 
of reality around me. 
The most time is spent on the soul. Whitehead seems to relate the 
49CSP, pp. 75-82. 
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soul and man as identical, although he insists that man is not the only 
creature with a soul. The human soul, for Whitehead, is not an individ-
ual entity, but a society.50 The body is the environment of'this socie-
ty, which is a part of the society's experience.51 Because it is a 
society, the soul has the capability of many experiences simultaneously. 
For example, it is capable for the human actual entity to both partake 
of food and carry on a serious discussion of high mental content. This 
would be an example of an intense physical and mental prehension occur-
ing at once. 
There is a way in which the human soul is distinctive from other 
souls. 
One way of distinguishing among souls is according to the sigfi-
cance to the individual dominant occasions of their serial con-
nectedness with each other. 
We may also distinguish between souls according to the relative 
importance of fresh organic stimuli and past experiences, 
The . . .more important basis for comparing men and other animals 
has to do with the quality of the occasions constituting their 
souls. 
When we ask specifically what distinguishes man from other ani-
mals, the single clear answer is language.52  
Thus man holds a rather special position in process thought, as would be 
expected of a system that is trying to describe the entirety of reality. 
The concepts of the self and the soul would intimate that man is, 
beyond other actual entities, more aware of his self than others. And 
50Cobb, p. 47. 
5 lIbid., P. 52. 
5 2Ibid., pp•  57-59, 
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this is a defensible position in a process framework.. 
The self is . . .always defined in terms of its values. If the val-
ues be transient, so is the self. If the values are intransient, so 
is the self. If the values be dispersed and incoherent, so is the 
self. If they are organized and integrated, so is the self. In the 
former case the person is analyzable, with little or no loss, into 
small and disorganized values which comprise his life. He lends 
himself to a deterministic theory of human nature, and the psycho-
analyst rightly presumes him to be the product of his past. In the 
latter case, the exact converse holds. The unified self, by defin-
tion cannot be understood in terms of his constituent parts as 
dissected away from one another. Instead of his being understood 
exclusively as the outcome of his environment, the environment can 
only be understood in terms of him. His very capacity to organize 
what might otherwise be discordant values puts him in a position 
of causal primacy.53  
This means that,there is a sense in which man is more self-identifying 
than other actual entities, but it is not necessarily so. Each human 
actual entity must employ his valuation to the extent that he does pre-
hend consciously what other entities and eternal objects are influencing 
him and how they are doing it for this to happen. This question of valu-
ation, and the organization of it, plays a particularly strong role in 
the ethics of process, as we shall see. 
This leads us, then, to our question about optimism and/or pes-
simism of the process anthropology. Here we must make allowance for 
what process thinkers actually have done in this regard and what the 
system is capable of doing. It is quite obvious that both Hartshorne and 
Whitehead hold highly optimistic views of man. This does not mean that 
our anthropology must necessarily do so. 
It is difficult to cite particular references in either Whitehead 
or Hartshorne to demonstrate this assertion. It is more a feeling that 
53Nathaniel Lawrence, "Time, Value and the Self," in The Relevance 
of Whitehead, edited by Ivor Leclerc (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1961), p. 159. 
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pervades their attitude. The whole notion of creativity suggests this. 
While it is admitted that creativity can result in negative forms, the 
entire prospect is that what the human actual entity self-creates is 
beneficial. Now it must be stressed that one of the purposes for this 
doctrine of creativity is to wrest the issue of evil away from any im-
plication of God's role in it. Now, we are here talking about moral, and 
not aesthetic, bad; the first implies choice and action, the second, 
influence and being acted upon. In the sense of aesthetic evil, God 
is affected.54  But God cannot be implicated in moral evil. 
Moral evil comes as a result of man's creativity (and in some 
sense, the creative action of all other actual entities). 
With a multiplicity of creative agents, some risk of conflict and 
suffering is inevitable. The source of evil is precisely this mul-
tiplicity. But it is equally the source'of go94. . . ,(C)reatures 
determine worldly particulars, good and evil. -27  
This is repeated often in both Whitehead and Hartshorne. But it begs the 
question of what evil is, its nature. 
Essentially, evil is a negative, not a positive, fact. "The nature 
of evil is that the character of things are mutually obstructive."56  
That is to say, evil is a misworking of the process. It would appear to 
be like thiss given the actual entities of the past and the eternal ob-
jects for each emerging actual entity, there is the best possible result, 
which would be the amalgamation of the subjective and initial aims pre- 
bending these so that the motion is constantly toward the initial aim. 
54MVG, pp. 195-7. 
55CSP, pp. 238-40. 
56
PR, P. 517. 
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The creative power of man is such, however, that he may prehend pos-
itively that which would distract from the initial aim, and thus set 
himself away from it. This avoids placing God in charge of evil and lo-
cates it in the actual entity; and it explains what obstruction is. 
The question is, then, do Whitehead and Hartshorne see this ob-
structive element as consistently making itself influential. In other 
words, do men frequently prehend these elements positively? It would 
appear not, for both are agreed that the general flow of actual enti-
ties is toward positive prehension of that which concurs with the ini-
tial aims for them. 
Do their views, optimistic as they are, negate the possibility of 
a pessimistic view of man? Not necessarily. But, in order to posit such 
a view, it will be necesary to take two questions into consideration. 
First, will not a pessimistic view of man result in an evil God? Second, 
does a pessimistic view relegate man to a lower status than other actual 
entities? 
Will not a pessimistic view of man result in an evil God? This 
question takes seriously the Consequent Nature of God, to wit, that, 
since the consequent nature is the multiplicity of actual occasions, 
will not the total effect of evil actual entities so constituting this 
nature make that nature a derived evil? The answer is no, at least not 
in essence. The reason for this is that God relates evil events to 
others in such a way that some positive value result.57 That is a way 
of saying that God turns evil into good, to the extent that, what sways 
57Norbert 0. Schedler, "The Development of Process Theology," un-
published lecture given at Concordia Senior College, Ft. Wayne, Indiana 
Spring, 1969, p. 9. (mimeographed) 
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from initial aim in the actual entity apart from God, does not do so in 
God, because God's subjective aim and initial aim are coincedental. 
Does a pessimistic view of man relegate man to a lower status than 
other actual entities? Not necessarily, since man is not the only actual 
entity capable is misprehending elements. But this is not a sufficient 
answer. In a sense, the issue is a specious one, for it presupposes that 
man must be, to be man, superior in all respects to other creatures. One 
of the prime tenets of process is that this superiority is merely one of 
value, not of quality. What is truly at stake here is the question of 
whether or not the human actual entity will be of a different modal sta-
tus than all other actual entities. If so, are they truly actual enti-
ties? 
The answer to this would have to be in the affirmative. The rela-
tionship between human actual entities and other actual entities has to 
do with the use, not availability, of prehensions. Animals, for example, 
are not considered to be sinful primarily because they do not, with fre-
quency, employ any conscious prehensions (thus, they are regarded as 
determined by their instincts), while man is so regarded because of the 
frequency of his conscious employment of them. Thus, man is, in terms of 
frequency, a more, in fact, the most, creative being. It is this creativ-
ity that leads to moral evil, and man is more inclined toward it than 
other entities. 
This last statement is, of course, a theological judgement and not 
necessarily derived from process concepts. It is a pessimistic view 
which is demanded so that our Ghristology might have more effect in the 
total scheme. Without such a pessimistic view, no matter what the system, 
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Christ must be seen as little more than a good example or assistant to 
man in his drive for subjective/initial aim fusion. 
This view does not, however, explain the concept of original sin, 
or why man consistently makes these 'bad' prehensions. Process could not 
maintain that original sin is merely the result of other actual entities 
about the individual (thereby avoiding Pelagianism); nor would it main-
tain that original sin is just the result of Satan (which would absolve 
man of responsibility if he were forced into sinfulness). Rather, it 
would maintain that such sinfulness is both the result of the influences 
around man and man's own choice to accept those influences. 
How this state becomes a part of every man is quite easily ex-
plained by process: it is handed on from individual to individual 
through biological transmission and historical circumstance. That is to 
say, because a man is the product of biological factors (physically), he 
shares the characteristics of those from whom he was produced. But he is 
also capable of prehending the past history to which he responds in 
some sense, positively or negatively. It is this response that is the 
problem. For man consistently says "yes" to those things to which he 
ought to say "no". 
This pessimistic doctrine of man would allow the Christology to 
function more fully; it has much to say about the function of the Spirit; 
it will have much to say about the whole question of ethics; and it will, 
eventually, shape the entire theology. It reflects as understanding that 
is essential for theology; for without man's denigration, in some sense, 
God's glorification is lessened. Process optimism does not allow so 
sharp a distinction between creature and Creator as theology prefers. 
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The Doctrine of the Church ( Ecclesiology ) 
For the Christian individual, there is no lone state in which he 
exists because theology consistently addresses itself to the doctrine of 
the Church. In this section, we will examine both what the Church is and 
what it does, which shall also bring us to a discussion of worship and 
the sacraments. There is nothing in Whitehead or Hartshorne which will 
tell us what they thought of the Church, per se, but several of their in-
sights into the nature of reality can be of help. 
Most simply put, the Church would have to be considered a nexus. 
If the group be considered merely in respect to . . .(a) basic 
property of mutual immanence, however otherwise lacking in common 
relevance, then -conceived as exemplifying this general connected-
ness- the group is termed a Nexus. 
A nexus,is, thus, a group of occasions that have some sort of related 
function. The nexus, then, becomes quite like an actual entity itself, 
for it is prehended as a whole.59 
This view of the Church as a nexus accomplishes several things at 
once. First, it explains how a variety of individuals can be seen as a 
whole. Second, it explains the continuity of purpose in the Church. Third, 
it does justice to the concept of variety within the Church. 
It has long been a concept about the Church that it has a unity 
that encompasses its purpose and its teachings. The concept of nexus re-
tains that concept of the Church. It would have been tempting to equate 
58AI, p. 258. 
59The holistic view of the nexus does not so amalgamate the occa-
sions comprising it that those individuals lose their identity; they are 
still prehended as themselves. 
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the Church's teaching with an eternal object, because of its lasting na-
ture. The concept of nexus, or society, encompasses the teaching while 
doing it greater justice, for it allows for greater variance within the 
society than would an eternal object. Eternal objects are not, per se, 
objects of historical investigation; the Church's history and teaching 
are. Thus, as nexus, we could say that the Church is that society which 
embodies a teaching which is transmitted with little variation withinthe 
constituent entities of the nexus. Further, the Church as nexus, can be 
seen as that group of occasions that prehend the intense figure of the 
actual occasion, Christ, with what amounts to a singular prehension. 
This leads us to the purpose of the Church, which the nexus ap-
praisal can explain. It would appear that one of the purposes of the 
Church is the transmission of its prehensions. That is, it must keep its 
view of Christ intact. This, of course, is embodied in the teaching to 
which we have referred. This is carried on by the individual occasions 
of the nexus which, as contemporaries, prehend with singularity, and, as 
past prehendable occasions, transmit with intensity to those occasions 
which prehend them. The total effect of the intense occasion of Christ, 
coupled with the intense occasion of the Spirit, and the intense occa-
sion of the past of the nexus, is a maintained continuity within that 
nexus. 
A second purpose of the Church is conversion, to which the sum 
effect of all this intensity lends its impact as well. We have stated 
that the prehension of Christ was so intense that it is practically un-
avoidable. The presupposition behind this was that this applied to those 
in whom the Spirit was already working faith. We now focus on those in 
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whom faith is not already rendered, While it is the Spirit that effects 
this conversion, it is done through the Church. Part of the prehensabil-
ity of the Church is it message and, while it is impossible for a non-
converted person to prehend Christ. immediately, he can do so mediately 
through the Church's teaching. 
A third purpose of the Church is reinstatement and maintenance of 
its continuation; that is to say, it must engage in forgiveness. In this 
purpose, the whole topic of the sacraments plays an important role. We 
have stated that sin is basically a distortion of subjective aims with 
their respective initial aims. This means that forgiveness must be 
viewed as a reestablishment of those two aims whenever particular 
breaches occur. 
Baptism would be considered as the initiation into the state of 
grace, but not fully. It is understood that, the moment conversion has 
occurred, that is, once an occasion has prehended the actual occasion 
Christ, he is to be considered as being in the nexus of the Church. How-
ever, this does not allow the rest of those occasions that compose the 
nexus to realize this. Consequently, baptism is that event which gives 
them this realization. The term 'realization' is used with particular 
stress, for.in no way do contemporaries prehend one another.60 
The Sacrament of the Altar presents an interesting study in pro-
cess-thought. We shall not focus on the question of the elements and 
their change, or lack of same.61 We are concerned with its effect. That 
6oCurtis, pp. 32-36. 
61Ibid., pp. 99-101. 
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effect is centered around forgiveness. The first way in which the Lord's 
Supper affects forgiveness is to be found in the fact that the occasions 
prehend restoration of their subjective aims to their initial aims. An-
other facet of this is that the individual occasions recognize that the 
nexus, which was in danger of being disrupted, is now intact once again. 
This means that they are forgiving one another in the action of the meal. 
The action of the communion is a recognition of one another as possible 
disruptors of the nexus (and thus the nexus' existence being gone), and 
yet, as occasions determined to continue the nexus. Therefore, they do 
not form new nexus, but retain the present one by resetting its original 
configuration. This occurs in the reaffirmation in the action of the meal 
that is a restatement of the teachings of the past. 
Forgiveness occurs on this lower level outside the sacraments as 
well, as the mutual prehension constantly reaffirms the members of the 
nexus. This means that the individual occasions continually transmit 
their prehensions to one another, which enables the subjective aims of 
each to remain within the confines of the initial aims of each. This is 
called a 'lower level' of forgiveness because it has to do with human oc-
casions dealing with other human occasions. We shall deal with God's for-
giveness in the last section of the chapter. 
The notion of the nexus allows for an explanation of the diversity 
within the unity evidenced by the Church. Because the nexus is composed 
of individual actual occasions which do not lose their distinctiveness, 
it cannot be considered as a static unity. Each actual entity within the 
nexus has its own peculiar prehensions besides the basic prehension that 
every member of the nexus shares. Thus, each member has a different reac- 
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tion to the world as it prehends it, and this means that there is a di- 
versity of approach to the world with the Christian faith. 
The Doctrine of the Last Things ( Eschatology ) 
The concept of eschatology involves two major considerations. The 
first of these is whether or not process has a notion that things will 
come to an end. The other concern is with the notions of heaven and hell 
as they can be drawn from process-thought. On the first, a short answer 
will suffice. More time needs to be spent on the other issue. 
As to whether or not there is a notion of the end of things, two 
things must be taken into account. First, it is obvious that eternal ob-
jects, by their nature, will never cease. The question then revolves 
around actual entities, It is true that individual actual entities do 
perish; but, with that perishing, they are assumed into the Consequent 
Nature of God. Were all occasions to cease, would this not affect the 
Consequent Nature of God? In a sense, yes, because that Nature would 
cease to expend, But, in another sense, the Consequent Nature would re-
main, although in a static state. The notion of a static world, however, 
is completely alien to process understanding. It would appear, then, that, 
while there is room with the thought for a notion of the end of all 
things, that notion would be very tenuous from the point of view of 
the process-thinkers themselves. 
The issues of heaven and hell have found some attention in the two 
major,figures, especially Hartshorne. To understand his view, we must 
see the way in which death is viewed. 
Either individuals are eternal realities -items in a complex of 
events . . .which as a whole came to be and cannot cease to be 
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but simply is- or else individuals are not eternal, since there 
are new ones from time to time, but yet, once in the total reality, 
no individuals can pass from this total. An individual becomes, he 
does not de-become or unbecome; he is created, he is not destroyed 
or decreated. 
Death is the last page of the chapter of the book of one's life, 
as birth is the first page of the first chapter. Without a first 
Page there is no book. But given the first page there is, so far, 
a book. The question of death then is, How rich and how complete 
is the book to be? It is not a question of reality.°2  
The view of death, then, is that death is not sheer destruction, for, 
even though the book is completed, it remains a book, it exists. This 
would give us the clue to immortality that would be necessary for any 
talk about life after death, or even eternal death. 
But Hartshorne comes up short of any interpretation that might in-
timate any form of physical (or quasi-physical) existence after the last 
page of the book.63 The problem is that religion has focused so much on 
these notions of heaven and hell that it has missed the main point about 
reality, namely, that it is here and now. 
The trouble with organized religion has been that the conceptions 
of heaven and hell were such as ..to imply the insignificance even 
of major wrongs in society. A man needed only to preserve his pi-
ety to win an infinity of blessedness in return for a handful of 
terrestrial joys. But the theistic doctrine does n9t itself imply 
any such heaven or the corresponding idea of hell.' 
Further, the ideas of heaven and hell are viewed in what might be called 
an historical sense. The life will lived is for the future, but reaps 
present enjoyment. 
It is natural to find inspiration in the thought that another will 
62LP, p. 250. 
63Ibid., p. 254. 
64BH, 
p. 
 76. 
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live more richly because I have lived, and in this thought one may 
find a reward for courageous and generous actions. But this regard 
is now, while I am performing the actions. I aim at a future result, 
namely, good to pother who survives my death, but this aiming is 
my present joy.'"J  
This conception of heaven, the converse of which would be meaningless 
living now that has no aim toward the future, or hell, is hardly what 
traditional theology has in mind when it talks about heaven. It is to be 
conceded that, too often, religious people have so used the traditional 
understanding to negate focus on the present problems. But this comes 
from a static view of what is meant by heaven and hell. 
Process can more easily entertain the dynamic theological idea of 
heaven as total unity with God and hell as total separation. Process 
would find the first especially imolied in its framework, since the no-
tion of the Consequent Nature of God already states this. Total separa-
tion from God would mean an entity's total negation of its being or hav-
ing been. To do so, would have effects-on the whole notion of becoming, 
for a negation of existence would imply that nothing was prehended, no-
thing became, and, therefore, nothing ever was. Thus, in process, we are 
faced with only one alternative- heaven. 
Ethics 
The whole question of ethics, in any scheme, is one that tends to 
comprise the entire framework of the system. Therefore, we have left 
this discussion to the last in order that we might take advantage of 
what has preceded it. Ethics asks so many questions that it is impos- 
65LP, D. 256. Italics original, 
92 
sible for us to deal with them all here. We cannot handle, fully, the 
process theory of value, or axiology; nor can we discuss at any length 
its understanding of morality. Our focus will have to be on how it is 
that God becomes involved in day-to-day living and how that applies to 
the Christian understanding of ethics. 
It has been pointed out that God is involved with man in setting 
his initial aim, to which, then, hopefully, man will merge his subjec-
tive aim. Now, obviously, with man's creative capabilities, he is not 
determined to act in any strict fashion. However, process does operate 
with a soft determinism; that is, it limits determinism but does not 
completely eradicate it. 
The setting is this: a man is given a range of possibilities. This 
comes from the insight that only God prehend.s all eternal objects. With-
in that range of possibilities, he can prehend what best suits the amal-
gamation of his subjective and initial aims. Any choice that is made is 
made freely, within the limitations of the situation. But the prehensions 
that go into any choice, prehensions which are past, vary in such a way 
that the individual may negatively prehend what he ought to prehend posi-
tively, or may prehend as important that whiah is trivial. 
For example; I am faced with the question of whether or not to 
take my car out on the highway. The problem is that the brakes on the 
car are woefully inadequate. It is, for all intents and purposes, a dan-
gerous prospect. However, I must be at work within the next half-hour, at 
a place which is located ten miles away, or lose my job. Now these are 
the facts to be considered. My responsibility to my employer and my fami-
ly demands that I get to work. My responsibility to other drivers of my 
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city demands that I not drive my car in its present condition. Now, 
which of these is the most intense? Both appear equally so; but add the 
factor of my having just enough cash to take a taxi to work, and that 
lessens the familial factor considerably, I can still retain my respon- 
sible attitude toward my family by getting to work. However, had the 
additional factor been a friend's advice that everyone drives cars in 
bad shape from time to time, the responsibility to the other drivers may 
have been lessened in intensity. 
Now, prehensions work something like that in daily behavior. They 
set patterns for focus for the actual occasion to ascertain the reali- 
ties open to it. They also establish the future; for what one prehends 
in the past will establish what possibilities lie open for it in the fu-
ture. 
The future is not prehendable in the strict sense. It can only 
give a basic configuration to the pattern of things. 
The future is immanent in the present by reason of the fact that 
the present bears in its own essence the relationships which it 
will have to the future. It thereby includes in its essence the 
necessities to which the future must conform. The future is there 
in the present, as a general fact belonging to the nature of 
things. . . .Thus the future is to the present as an object for a 
subject. It has an objective existence in the present. But the ob-
jective existence of the future in the present differs from the ob-
jective existence of the past in the present. The various particu-
lar occasions of the past are in existence, and are severally func-
tioning as objects for prehension in the present. . . ,But there 
are no actual occasions in the future, already constituted. Thus 
there are no actual occasions in the future to exercise efficient 
causation in the present. What is objective in the present is the 
necessity of a future of actual occasions, and the necessity that 
these future occasions conform to the conditions inherent in the 
essence of the present occasion:66  
66
AI, pp. 250-1. Italics added. 
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The future is, in essence, pure potentiality, which, of course, alligns 
it very closely with the Primordial Nature of God. 
If the future is a part of the Primordial Nature of God, it means 
that God has a latch on the future. This is not the same as the classical 
view of an omniscient God who knows all that is to happen. That notion is 
quite apart from process thinking. If God is an actual entity, he cannot 
prehend the future any more than any other actual entity. But it does 
mean to say that he has a better picture of the future possibilities 
based on the past than all other actual entities because he has a better 
prehension of all eternal objects. 
God transcends actual occasions, His experience is infinite in 
scope. It is true that, relative to some standpoint, God has not 
then experienced those actualities which will come into being in 
the future. But he eternally experiences all pure potenti.ls, in-
cluding those specially relevant to the future becomings.° 
This is what is meant by God being the one who establishes the initial 
aims for each emergent actual occasion. 
In his awareness of the future, God is able to see what will and 
what will not harmonize the subjective and initial aims. In this sense, 
he is somewhat like a statistical computer (although the imagery hardly 
fits this philosophical scheme) that predicts on the basis of known facts. 
As he sees the merging or divergence of these aims, he can note which 
possibilities do, in fact, become real possibilities for each occasion. 
In so seeing, he can influence the eternal objects that will appear as 
the past to the present and thus order the future for each occasion. 
This ordering of the future by God is primarily the point at which the 
67Christian, p. 373. Italics original. 
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question of ethics becomes invloved. 
If each actual occasion is faced with an ordered future, in what 
sense does its own creativity play a part? The future is ordered, not 
determined. This means that there is a limited range of selection. And 
not every selection will be equally beneficial to the occasion. The cre-
ativity of the occasion has a part in ordering the future as well, be-
cause every occasion has an influence on God. The pattern runs like this: 
the occasion has potentials in the past that will make it become some-
thing other than it is, depending on the prehension that the occasion 
makes of the past. Now, to be sure, God has a hand in ordering that past, 
but only in offering a limit; the occasion can still negatively prehend 
that which God would envision as the best possible positive prehension. 
Because of what was ordered in the Past, the future is also ordered by 
God, but it is limited also and also based on the prehensions the the 
occasion actually makes. Thus, at each point of decision and prehension 
by the occasion, the past and the future are reordered, depending on the 
prehension.68 
In each possible future, there is contained a best possible direc-
tion for the occasion that is based on a best possible prehension of the 
past. 'Best', here, means that which will lead to the unification of the 
aims. From a Christian context, that best would have to include the di- 
rection of the occasion toward acts of love, forgiveness, helping, etc., 
based on the best prehension of the past, namely Christ. Thus the Chris-
tian is always trying to prehend Christ, and thus be guided by his ex- 
68See Appendix C, Figure 3. 
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ample, and to prehend that which prehends Christ best, the Spirit, and 
be guided by that Spirit. When this fails to occur, when Christ is not 
the intensive prehension, it is called sin, or moral evil. But, as soon 
as that event is past, God reorders the future and past to allow the best 
to recur in the next situation. 
Now, a consideration has to be made as to whether thos form of 
ethics is the best form, in the Christian view. It is my contention that 
Christian ethics must be rule deontological,69 that is, it must be 
based on a set of injunctions. At the very least, it must be act deon-
tological, that is, governed by specific 'approved' actions. It cannot 
be teleological, that is, based on the results it produces. Process 
seems to fall either in the realm of teleology or act deontology, it is 
somewhat hard to assess. It has the characteristics of teleology in the 
sense that the actions produce the results that are the basis for eval-
uation. But it bears a stronger resemblance to act deontology in the 
sense that it is concerned so heavily with the act of prehension. In any 
event, at its best, it is act deontology, which would suggest that it is 
not the best form of ethics for a Christian interpretation. 
69
For a better look at the definitions of these three categories of 
ethics, see William K. lankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 13-16, or, Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen , 
Moral Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 83-113. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
We have presented the system of process-thought, centering on the 
two major figures of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. Any 
evaluation of how well that presentation has been made is not germaine 
to these concluding remarks, since, if it could have been done different-
ly, it would have been. It should be noted, however, that space and time 
did not permit as extensive a presentation as has been done by others. 
Any lacks in the presentation shall have to be attributed to this lack 
of time and space. 
The doctrines.uresented, based on this system, comprise but an 
outline of the theology that appears possible from this scheme. In no 
sense did this thesis intend to fully examine and draw out every point 
possible in each doctrine. Such an endeavor would have, at least, tre-
bled the volume of this work. In each case and point of doctrine, the 
philosophy of process was regarded sympathetically, and every effort was 
made to give its ideas fair hearing. In some cases, the system was bent 
to allow it to better conform to traditional theological notions. 
We have argued that Hartshorne's evaluation and use of the onto-
logical argument for God's existence is ouite valid and offers substan-
tial viability for the future of theology. Further, concerning the pro-
cess understanding of God, we have argued that it is not a non-religious 
notion, but very available for religious and theological purposes. 
Concerning the doctrine of Christ, we have said that process has a 
place for both the humanity and the deity of Christ. Further, we have 
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suggested that, in regard to the humanity of Christ, there is even room 
for a notion of the Virgin Birth, Noreover, process understands the at-
onement in a sense of changing God and his relationship to man, if the 
process notion of a good God is assumed to be in relation to those of 
faith. The understanding of the importance of Christ has been shown to 
be in the fact of his availability for prehension by other actual enti-
ties that will enable the merging of their subjective and initial aims, 
We have pointed out that the pneumatology of this system is the 
weak link in the chain. The problem of reconciling the aspects of the 
Spirit that resemble both actual entities and eternal objects is a for-
midable one, and we were not sufficiently successful in doing it. 
Concerning the anthropology, we have pointed out that process 
holds a view of man that makes him essentially creative. This led us to 
consider the optimism or pessimism of process concerning man, which we 
said was essentially optimistic but could be shown to have a pessimistic 
side that is in keeping with the theological evaluation of man. 
Our brief ecclesiology has shown that the Church should be consid-
ered as a nexus. There is some indication in Whitehead that a nexus and 
a society have some variance in attributes, We have assumed that the two 
terms are interchangeable and essentially equal. As a nexus, it was ar-
gued that the Church's unity, continuity and varity could all be exr 
plained. 
The eschatology argued that the process notion of eternity did not 
include a notion of hell, but had a dynamic view of heaven, It was also 
shown to what extent death should be considered as an end to things, at 
which point we concluded that it is not the destruction of existence, but 
the cessation of change within any existent entity. 
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The ethics presented here argued that God is the ordering factor 
of the universe, and, when there is unity of aims, the ordering principle 
of man's behavior. We have also shown that man's creativity allows him 
to be indeterminate in his actions, within a limited scope and range of 
possibilities. We have also argued that the process ethic was essentially 
act deontological, with some indication of teleology, and that this was 
a problem for the Christian point of view. 
This outline would suggest what work must be done to better enable 
process-thought to present a fuller theology. A resolution to the prob-
lem of the pneumatology must be found, since on it the ecclesiology, eth-
ics and Christology hang. A further investigation of the Christology 
would be helpful for a better look at the work and accomplishments of 
Christ. Certainly, a more expansive ecclesiology would be in order. The 
whole issue of ethics, broad as it is, demands that, not only must more 
principles be worked out from the process mold, but also it would be 
helpful to see some process answers to particular ethical issues that are 
currently besetting us. 
APPENDIX A 
NATURAL THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY AND REVELATION 
Ever since the relationship between philosophy and theology has 
been anything but assumed identification, the issues have revolved around 
natural theology, and its precedent metaphysics, and revealed theology 
as answers to the intellectual and worshipful demands of faithful peo-
ple, Historically,,this has evolved into one of two issues: either re-
vealed theology is the superior discipline and metaphysics and result-
ant natural theology is subservient (philosophy is the haidmaid of the-
ology); or, metaphysics is the superior discipline and revealed theology 
must subsume and/or omit whatever is contradictory to or incompatible 
with it (theology is the handmaid of philosophy). The question appears 
to be an either/or proposition. However, it is possible that both are 
correct and usable. 
The first posture has several variables to it that need to be ex-
plored. It presupposes that what is revealed is necessarily true, while 
what is investigatively or logically induced or deduced is only contin-
gently so. While it remains true that (given the a priori assumption that 
revelation reveals nothing that is false or misleading) revelation re-
veals necessary truths, this does not deny that metaphysical truths are 
also necessary. But, given the necessary truths that revelation brings 
forth, revelation has its limitations. 
The limitations on revelation often have to do with its intellect-
ual formulation. Because of the very nature of revelation, it is not a 
systematic proposition. Every known theology that is based on revelation 
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has a need to be systematized. Christianity, Islam, Judaism all need 
some form of sorting-out of the truths that are revealed. And because 
the revelation is not systematic, it contains, or there are derived from 
it, paradoxes or logical inconsistencies. Left on their own, the incon- 
sistencies will pose problems for human intelligence which seeks to har- 
monize any such problems. 
The advantages of revealed theology are that it offers a vision of 
God which does not stop merely at his existence (here we are speaking, 
from a Christian context). It presents a picture of God that allows man 
to see God's benevolence, passion, love, justice and grace. Apart from 
telling man that God is, revelation proposes to tell man what God is. It 
accomplishes this task very well. 
Natural theology is lacking precisely at this point. We are here 
speaking about empirical natural theology which offers proofs of God from 
a posteriori evidence. It is limited to showing, and at that inconclu-
sively, that God is a reasonable supposition in the world. It can, with 
limited success, establish the fact of a creative God, but anything else 
that would attempt to describe the nature of God is without its scope. 
Philosophical theology, or what has often been called metaphysics, 
has the advantage over natural theology in that it works with a priori  
principles. Furhter, metaphysics can, again with limitations, provide 
far more certain clues to the nature of God. Its proofs for God's exist-
ence are for more convincing and logical than are those of natural theo-
logy; its presuppositions far less assailable. Metaphysics has the disad-
vantage of trying to do away with all forms of paradox and mystery, which 
presents no problem for the intellegentia, but will distract from the 
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common worshipper. 
The relationship among all three of these postures is such that 
they can mutually benefit from each other's strengths to shore up their 
own weaknesses. Philosophical theology can be used to logically present 
the truths or revelation; revelation can provide what natural theology 
cannot; natural theology can provide an alternative proof for philoso-
phical theology. These relationships are not, in the strict sense, those 
that have been historically attached to them- the either/or of subservi-
ence. The relationship is more like mutual inclusiveness than mutual ex-
clusiveness. 
The problem, historically, has been that the relationship between 
revelation and philosophical theology has been misconstrued. It has been 
proposed that, if one arrives at a point where the two seem to diverge, 
a choice must be made of one over the other. This is not necessarily so. 
This problem is more basic than mere accidental divergence. The problem 
has been that revelation has been too dependent on philosophical theo-
logy for its validation. The entire substance-accidents thesis of clas-
sical metaphysics has led to this. Because humans are inclined to accept 
an explanation rather than a mystery, they have consistently opted for 
the philosophical answer over the revealed. In this sense, theology has 
been relegated to the position of handmaid to philosophy. 
To restore the equilibrium, it is necessary that revelation be re-
stored to a position of logical consistency. In the past, where classical 
metaphysics has failed to explain satisfactorily various problems, one of 
two options has been taken. The philosopher has sided with his discipline; 
the theologian has exercised a logical jump that proves to be intellectu- 
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ally disastrous. A significant example is the Christian conception of 
the Incarnation. Based on the substance,accidents thesis, it is impos-
sible for the transcendent God to become immanent without completely 
distoring the philosophical framework within which the thesis is to be 
presented. Consequently, one finds theologians dismissing the problem by 
the leap of faith which avoids the dilemma. 
Such practices benefit neither the intellect nor the faith of in-
dividuals. Too often, such leaps are taken much to far in advance of 
plausible explanation. All the possibilities are not explored, and this 
is why theology, in academic circles and elsewhere, has failed to enjoy 
a very noble position- it simply does not make use of it claims is the 
God-given intellect of man. 
This would suggest that theology, for the sake of presenting its 
insights and truths, must employ more conscientiously the insights that 
metaphysics can offer. It must make use of the logical bases upon which 
philosophical investigation is based. This is not to say that theology 
must become the handmaid of philosophy; it is to say that, when theology 
wishes to say something of importance to man, it must do so in terms 
that man understands and will not reject out of hand. 
APPENDIX B 
A LUTHERAN EVALUATION OF PROCESS 
It is quite obvious that every attempt has been made within the 
text to bring process theology into accord with the presuppositions of 
this writer, namely, into a Lutheran perspective. It is also obvious 
that this has not been completely successful. The following offers a 
brief Lutheran critique of the process theology as we hav developed it. 
No evaluation of other process theologies is here supposed. 
First, two general observations seem in order: 
Process is not Biblically based. This, in itself, is not a damaging 
critique, given the task of philosophical theology. It does point out, 
however, that process cannot be the norm of future theologizing. At best, 
it can serve to assist in the proclamation of that theology. 
Process is basically rationalistic. This carries with it the notion 
that man's intellectual ability does not allow him to fully understand 
the nature of God. Process has done much in helping us to better picture 
what we already know, and to do so logically and consistently. However, 
it supposes that it has acheived a full understanding of the nature of 
God, which is impossible. 
These general critiques offers some clues to more specific cri-
tiques of doctine that we should examine. First, as aforementioned, the 
Process notion of God is such that it supposes that it has answered all 
questions concerning his nature. One is tempted here to agree with Til-
lich's notion that the God of worship and faith is the God beyond the God 
of theism. Certainly, the Comfessions work with a God that is not fully 
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knowable, but retains many mysteries. 
Second, the neoclassical metaphysics of Hartshorne is not the met- 
aphysics of the Confessions. The Confessions are based on the caissical 
mode. This would suggest that Lutherans who wish to remain true to the 
Confessions must seriously examine at which points the neoclassical 
scheme is problematic. Some points to notice are the conception of con-
tingency in God, the understanding of God's immanence, and the concept 
of God as actual occasion. 
Further, it would seem that Lutherans would have difficulty with 
the process ethics, since it is not rule deontological, The lack of this 
rule deontology would do away with the whole area of the Decalogue and, 
in a sense, do harm to the Law/Gospel distinction of Lutheranism. 
Process light also come under the criticism of Gospel reductionism 
in a very strong sense, since it lacks, as far as we have presented it, 
any clear notion of Law. In attempting to overcome the problem of attrib-
uting evil to God, process has also done grave harm to His justice and 
verdict on man. 
Finally, it would appear that Lutherans would have a problem with 
the notion of Christ, since it focuses more on what Christ was that what 
he accomplished. Little attention and stress is placed on the death and 
resurrection of Christ, more on what kind of person he was. This is a 
serious lack since, without a. strong idea of the benefit of Christ's 
work, the ethics and notiom of salvation are strongly defective. 
Figure 2: 
a.) Past Present 
APPENDIX C 
The following figures have been drawn up to better enable the read-
er to visualize what has been said in the body of this thesis. Refer-
ences to these figures have been made in the text, which will set the 
context for their presentation. The verbal descriptions accompanying 
these figures are to better explain what is depicted. 
Figure 1: 
Past Present Future 
o h o 
  
'0(6-Prehension 
0 
The components of the left-hand side of the figure are the actual 
entities (A, B, C, D, etc.) that are available for the actual occasion's 
(0) prehension. It is to be noted that there are other entities about, 
but they are not prehendable by this occasion. This is what is meant by 
God ordering the past. Point (I) is the result of this prehension, as en-
visioned, or the initial aim of the occasion. In this case, the subjec-
tive aim (S) is compatible with the initial aim. Note that the future is 
also ordered ( Al, Bl, C1, etc.) in relation to the mast. Thus, if the 
occasion in the present prehends B, B1 is the future that awaits him. 
to the future (B). 
b.) Past Present 
0 
Future 
0 
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Here we see the prension of the intense actual occasion, Christ, 
as it prehended throught the intense actual occasion of the Spirit (C & 
S on the left). Note that this prehension also includes (b) which leads 
Note that in this case the intense occasion of the Spirit had di-
minished in intensity, which allowed the occasion (0) to miss the inten-
sity of Christ (C). Accodingly, instead of prehending the good choice of 
(b), it prehended the less beneficial occasion (d). 
Figure 3: 
a.) Past Present Future 
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Here we see the occasion in the present with past occasions ready 
for its. prehension. The grid at the right represents the ordering of the 
futures based on those prehensions. In this case, when the occasion pre - 
hends (B), it is the best choice, and thus leads to a unified subjective 
and initial aims. 
b.) East Present Future 
Present Future c.) Past 
D1 
A2 A3 A4 A 
C C3 C4 C5 
D2 D3 D4 D5 
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Here we see what happens when the occasion chooses other than the 
best possible choice ( B being the best, D the lesser). The future re-
mains structured as it was, but the divergence between the initial and 
subjective aims has begun. 
Using the same set-up as (3b.), we can see what happens after the 
choice has been made. In this case, that which was future is now past, 
and available for prehension. Having now seen where choice (D) will take 
it, the occasion now reviews the :past, and reselects, this time choosing 
the best, which reunites his subjective and initial aims. 
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